Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 59

Issue 1

Article 4

December 1982

Twenty-One Years of Affirmative Action: The Maturation of the
Administrative Enforcement Process under the Executive Order
11,246 as Amended
James E. Jones Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James E. Jones Jr., Twenty-One Years of Affirmative Action: The Maturation of the Administrative
Enforcement Process under the Executive Order 11,246 as Amended, 59 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 67 (1982).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol59/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE
MATURATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT PROCESS UNDER THE
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11,246 AS
AMENDED
JAMES

E.

JONES, JR.*

In administration as in architecture "form follows function,"' or at
least it should. If we misperceive the function, the forms chosen are
likely to be inept. To that extent, then, the substance of the law (in this
case, Executive Orders 10,9252 and 11,2463), including both articulated
and implied obligations and remedies, ought to determine the form, the
structure if you will, adopted for its administration. This is an odd way
to begin a discussion on the maturation of the enforcement process of
the executive order program on equal employment opportunity and affirmative action. I think, however, it is an appropriate beginning as this
article is about the halting, almost stumbling, process by which we have
progressed, from ill-thought-out, rudimentary approaches to enforcement of the program, to the current state of the art.
The fundamental premise, critical to the thesis of this article, is
that the affirmative action obligation is a contractual undertaking imposed by the Executive Orders without concern for the guilt or innocence of the subject contractors and without concern for individual
entitlement to the fruits of affirmative action efforts. Thus, an individ* B.A., 1950, Lincoln University; M.A., 1951, University of Illinois; J.D., 1956, University
of Wisconsin. The author is professor of law and of industrial relations at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where he has taught courses in equal employment for the past 12 years. He
views the maturation of the enforcement process of Executive Orders of the Presidents on job
discrimination from a unique perspective. In 1961 he was the principal draftsman of the first rules
and regulations for the administration of Executive Order 10,925. In the years preceding the
enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he was the principal attorney for the
Secretary of Labor in representing the Administration before Congress both on his custodianship
of the Executive Order program and on equal employment legislation. In 1968, after becoming
the Associate Solicitor of Labor for Labor Relations and Civil Rights, he supervised the revision
of the Rules and Regulations. He was the primary legal architect of the Revised Philadelphia
Plan, the issuance of which precipitated the "goals vs. quotas" debate. Since joining academe he
has continued to study and write on EEO matters. His article on the maturation of the enforcement process of the Executive Order, looks, from his unique vantage point, at the past, selected
evidence of the "drift" of the law and projects its future course.
I. "Form ever follows function." Louis Henry Sullivan, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 838a (1968).
2. 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961).
3. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965).
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ual complaint oriented process of enforcement completely misperceives
the function which should have been the major emphasis of the administrative process. Our collective failure in 1961 to appreciate the overriding significance of the affirmative action element of Executive Order
10,925 led to an administrative model that over-emphasized the importance of the individual complaint process. The administrative structure, the rules and, ultimately, their reception by the courts all suffered
because of this failure. It has taken almost 20 years for us to begin to
recognize that the affirmative action thrust of Executive Order 10,925
and its successor orders is conceptually ill-suited for vindicating rights
through a plaintiff-complaint process. It seems even more certain that
the modem rules and regulations 4 are ill-designed for implementation
of the affirmative action obligations at the behest of the affected classes.
This article argues that the rules and regulations which over the
years have been developed to implement the executive order program
have not adequately provided for vindication of individual rights by
the affected classes nor for enforcement of the affirmative action obligations by the government at the affected classes' behest.
There are several primary reasons for these failures:
1. The individual complaint process, as designed in the rules and
regulations, is ill-suited for compelling the imposition of the sanctions of debarment, cancellation, or black listing of contracts,
2. That process is also ill-suited to compel contractor compliance
with affirmative action obligations, and
3. As designed, the process gives only limited rights, if any, to affected class members to initiate or affect the course of administrative
adjudication, thus frustrating the vindication of rights solely or primarily individual in nature.
There is nothing inherently wrong with an administrative structure
which the affected classes can manipulate on their own behalf either by
explicit provision for such actions or an implied right.' However, the
original rules and regulations and interpretations by the Attorney General, 6 contributed to eventual court determination that the President
did not intend the affected classes to have an independent right of action. 7 They also contributed to the illusion that individuals could manipulate the administrative process on their own behalf.
This article will examine the early cases in the 1960's which
4. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.1 through 60-741.54 (1981).
5. See discussion, infra, on right of action by implication in text accompanying notes 213225.
6. The Attorney General's opinion is in 42 Op. Att'y. Gen. 97 (1961).
7. See Farkas, Farmer, and other cases discussed infra in text accompanying notes 31-50.
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emerged as individuals sought judicial oversight of the executive order
program. Aggrieved individuals first brought cases against government
contractors under a third party beneficiary theory. While the early
cases rejected the third party beneficiary theory, they strongly suggested that the proper avenue for relief lay in resort to existing administrative remedies provided by the rules and regulations. This rejection
of the third party beneficiary theory had become conventional wisdom
before the ascendency of right of action by implication. 8
The pivotal case is Hadnoll v. Laird,9 since it first strongly suggested the real possibility of judicial review upon exhaustion of administrative remedies. At the same time, there were developments in
administrative law also generally more favorable to judicial review, including more lenient rules on standing and a presumption of reviewability of final agency action.
The difficulty which the affected classes encountered in obtaining
judicial relief was in contrast to the success of contractors in obtaining
pre-enforcement judicial review of agency action under the Executive
Orders. This article will suggest that these contractor-initiated cases
reflected judicial efforts to accommodate the rights, obligations, and
duties under the Executive Orders of affected classes, contractors, the
government and the courts to generally accepted concepts of administrative law.
By 1970, evidence of the arrival of the administrative process at
the threshold of administrative maturity came in the judicial acceptance of the bonafides of the Executive Order program in the form of
approval of the use of affirmative action goals and timetables.
The "mark of maturity" of the administrative process arrived in
the 1970's as courts applied traditional administrative principles to enforcement of Executive Order 11,246. The article seeks to avoid overstating the case for maturity of process because none of these principles
has been specifically endorsed by the Supreme Court in cases involving
the Executive Order. However, it suggests that selected cases provide
persuasive if not compelling authority for the following:
1. The government is generally required to provide an opportunity
for a hearing before imposing any sanctions;
2. Contractors are increasingly being required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking pre-enforcement judicial reviews;
3. The right of affected class members to judicial review is available
after exhaustion of administrative remedies, although difficulties re8. Id.
9. 463 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Freeman v. Shultz, 468 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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main in determining when final agency action has occurred and
when affected class members are "parties aggrieved" entitled to seek
review;
4. Government access to the courts for specific performance of the
Executive Order's contractual obligations is available in appropriate
circumstances, including actions for back pay to the affected class
members;
5. Mandamus will lie at the behest of affected class members
against the government for compliance with the Order and the rules
and regulations where such actions are appropriate.
It is also suggested that in the recent past (1972-80) the government has evidenced a greater willingness to enforce the Order and a
decreasing likelihood of being appeased by contractors. Continuation
of enforcement would make it more likely that civil rights advocates
would rely upon the administrative process, rather than seek an implied right of action against contractors or direct action against the government. However, if the current administration reverts to soft or nonenforcement of Executive Order 11,246, rejection of the administrative
process is likely in favor of more creative tactics-yet to be devised.
While the affirmative action program has made major strides in
the past two decades in providing employment opportunities to the affected classes, the courts thus far have not applied the lately popular
"implied right of action theory" to efforts by affected class members to
enforce Executive Order 11,246.10
The article will conclude that there is a gradual drift in the case
law, and in agency rules and regulations, toward acceptance and application of recognized principles of administrative law to adjudication
under the Executive Order. It will suggest that transfer of the Executive Order enforcement to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission would encourage further maturity in the administrative
enforcement process and facilitate orderly and equitable judicial
oversight.
BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When a more comprehensive history of this country's efforts to
assure equality of employment opportunities is finally written, it is
likely that the roots of modem affirmative action will be found not to
have been the novel enunciation in Executive Order 10,92511 issued by
John F. Kennedy on March 16, 1961, but to have been tucked into the
10. See discussion, infra, of Cannon v. University of Chicago, Cort v. Ash and developments
following them in text accompanying notes 213-225.
11. 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961).
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policy of the initial order of Franklin D. Roosevelt issued on June 25,
1941.12 The foregoing statement is a discovery for this writer despite
the fact that my personal involvement with Executive Order 10,925 began in March of 1961 when I was assigned as a staff lawyer to the Task
Force in the United States Department of Labor which was established
to organize the new President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity.
President Roosevelt declared in the first Executive Order on Equal
Opportunity that it was the "policy of the United States that there shall
be no discrimination in the employment . . .because of race, creed,
color, or national origin." He further declared it to be the duty of employers' and labor organizations "to provide for thefull and equitable
participation of all workers in defense industries without discrimination. .... ,,13 This admonition, or duty and obligation as the case may
be, was extended to all contracting agencies of the federal government
by Executive Order 9,346. 14 The President asserted that full manpower
(human resources) utilization was the national goal in 1941, and exclusion of Blacks was a major barrier to the achievement of this goal. I
suggest that the duty of "full and equitable participation" in employment could have been a basis for imposition of what we know today as
affirmative action. However, the FDR program did not last long
enough for creative interpretations to emerge. Moreover, as was also
the case with Executive Order 10,925 in 1961, the problems in 1941 of
rank discrimination were so rampant that there was neither time nor
resources to deal with esoteric issues such as "full and equitable participation" and "affirmative action."
During the early days, 1961-65, the government's enforcement policy was one of persuasion. Except for the efforts of affected class plaintiffs,' 5 there is no record of any formal attempts to enforce the
Executive Order. In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there was
express congressional recognition of Executive Order 10,925 and its
successor Orders in the language of the Act. This congressional blessing of the President's efforts, along with subsequent appropriations by
the Congress, provided legal authority for a bolder approach. When
Lyndon Johnson became President, he issued Executive Order 11,24616
which in addition to incorporating the substantive aspects of the Ken12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Executive Order, No. 8,802, 26 Fed. Reg. 6585, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1941).
Id., Preamble 3 (emphasis added).
8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1943).
See text accompanying notes 21-74.
3 C.F.R. 339 (1965).
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nedy Orders, changed the organizational structure for the administration of the program. Powers previously lodged in the President's
Committee were delegated to the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary
subsequently delegated much of his authority to the Office of Contract
17
Compliance which he established within the Department of Labor.
Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan so far, have continued
to operate under the substantive provisions of Executive Order
11,246,18 as amended by Executive Order 11,375,1 9 which in 1967 added "sex" to the affected classes. Carter's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1978, consolidated enforcement in the Department of Labor, rather
than in contracting agencies. 20 This latter move probably has contributed to more orderly administrative process in the enforcement of this
program, but this is an intuitive judgement not based upon data.
Suits to Enforce the Executive Order-The Early Days
In 1961, if a lawyer looked at the Rules and Regulations of the
President's Committee 2' for an indication of the legal process available
to vindicate the interests of a minority client, it was reasonable to conclude that an administrative procedure existed in which the plaintiff
could participate and that such procedure might include judicial review. 22 Several provisions of the Rules dealt with general enforcement
and a complaint procedure.2 3 Not only were there instructions as to the
filing of a complaint, but the investigation and processing of the com24
plaint by the contracting agency was couched in mandatory language.
Although general rules of procedure under which one could actually
conduct a hearing were not promulgated until later, 25 it was reasonable
to conclude that the 1961 rules reflected an intent that the affected
classes be able to activate the administrative process and influence its
17. See Jones, The Transformation of Fair Employment Policies Practices,Ch. 7, in FEDERAL
POLICIES AND WORKER STATUS SINCE THE THIRTIES, IRRA (1976); Jones, Federal Contract Com-

pliance in PhaselI-The Dawning of the Age ofEnforcement of Equal Employment Obligations, 4
GA. L. REV. 756 (1970).

18. 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
19. 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967).
20. 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978).
21. The published rules and regulations of the President's Committee were generally available by 1963. Government contract employment, rules and regulations of the President's Committee on Equal Employment, effective July 22, 1961, as amended on November 23, 1962, The
Government Printing Office, (1963), Fed. Reg. Doc. 61-6955, July 21, 1961; as amended by Fed.
Reg. Doc. 61-11838, Dec. 13, 1961, as amended Fed. Reg. Doc. 62-11703, Nov. 23, 1962.
22. There was also the possibility that final agency action would be committed to "unreviewable discretion." See Hadnott v. Laird, 463 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
23. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.21 through 60-1.23 (1961 rules).
24. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.24 (1962 rules).
25. 41 C.F.R. § 60-30 (1980), first promulgated in 37 Fed. Reg. 20,536 (1972).
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course. Few civil rights advocates would have dreamed that the government would be reluctant or unwilling to activate the enforcement
26
process pursuant to an individual complaint.
If, however, one looked at those rules with the assumption that the
government would be reluctant to initiate enforcement, and therefore
searched for explicit rights of the affected classes to manipulate the process, one would have found that the right to file a complaint is the only
explicit right. The mandatory aspects of the complaint process are duties of the contracting agencies which can be interpreted as duties owed
27
to the President's Committee and not to the protected classes.
There are rights for non-governmental entities in the rules, but
they are the rights of the contractors prior to the imposition of sanctions. In the Attorney General's opinion, regarding the validity of the
Executive Order 10,925 there is no discussion of rights of the protected
28
classes in an administrative process, only the rights of the contractors.
The misperceptions and omissions from the rules of those rights
seemed to have been relatively harmless at that time. There were no
attempts by civil rights advocates to force the government to conduct
administrative hearings until much later. 29 In the early days, there
were informal political pressures for enforcement, continuously, and
there was constant criticism of the failure of the government to impose
any sanctions. It would be a useful bit of research to find out why the
first efforts by protected class members to enforce the Executive Order
against contractors were made in the courts with few attempts to resort
to the administrative process. I suspect lack of familiarity in 1961 with
administrative procedure by other than the Washington lawyer may
have been a factor. Civil rights advocates were most familiar with ac30
tions in the federal courts under the Constitution.
In the first case on record, Farmer v. PhiladelphiaElectric Company in March of 1963, 3' the court dismissed the plaintiffs action
26. In the hearings on the first proposed rules and regulations of June 6 and 7, 1961, no
substantial criticisms of the enforcement process were lodged.
27. See e.g., Perkins v. Lukens, 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
28. See 42 Op. Att'y. Gen. 97 (1961) regarding the validity of requiring express contract
provisions of Executive Order No. 10,925 in all contracts and the imposition of the sanctions made
explicit for the first time in that order.
29. We do not really know if plaintiffs with lawyers would have attempted to process cases
had the rules been clear but at least political flak from the Civil Rights advocates was not apparent
until much later.
30. For example, William R. (Bob) Ming who brought the action in Todd v. Joint Apprentice
Committee, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1963), vacated 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 914 (1965), was a long time civil rights lawyer.
31. 215 F. Supp. 729 (E.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd 329 F.2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1964).
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against a government contractor which alleged racial discrimination in
violation of Executive Order 10,925. The court reasoned that if it considered the plaintiffs action as a breach of contract, it had no jurisdiction because of lack of diversity. 32 If, however, it considered the action
as arising under the Executive Order, assuming the Executive Order
had the force and effect of law, then there was no private right of action
granted by that Order. 33 The court concluded that only administrative
remedies were intended under the Order, and it rejected the private
34
causes of action.
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the court affirmed the decision
below. 3 5 It held that, even assuming that the Executive Order and regulations had the force and effect of law, they did not provide a remedy
to the plaintiff under third party beneficiary theory. 36 Noting that
plaintiffs had not complied with the rules and procedures for filing
complaints, the Third Circuit thought the case a proper one for appli37
cation of the doctrine of "exhaustion of administrative remedies." It
declined to determine whether the federal court would have had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs case if the plaintiff had exhausted
these remedies.
In Todd v. Joint Apprentice Committee, 38 in October of 1963, the
lawyers went to court on a combination of constitutional, federal statutory, and Executive Order grounds and sought direct action against the
contractors under a third party beneficiary theory, among other
claims. 39 The suit involved state, federal and private entities, including
a union, a contractor and subcontractors subject to Executive Order
10,925. The court rejected the third party beneficiary theory, 40 but allowed the action and granted relief under the other provisions of law
without substantial attention to whether there was a right of action for
32. Id. at 730-31.
33. Id. at 732. The court refers to the history of the Executive Orders and to Pasley, The NonDiscrimination Clause in Government Contracts, 43 VA. L. REV. 837 (1957). [Hereinafter cited as
Pasley]. The Pasley article also referred to the 1953 Report to the President's Committee on Government Contract Compliance which considered alternative enforcement approaches including
the third party beneficiary theory and a specific clause conferring a right of action upon affected
classes. The Report recommended that such changes be rejected. 215 F. Supp. at 733, n. 10.
34. 215 F. Supp. at 733-34.
35. 329 F.2d 3 (3rd Cir. 1964).
36. Id. at 10.
37. Id.
38. 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. IUl. 1963), vacated 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 914 (1965).
39. Claims were asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343,
1346, and 1361, and the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as
under Executive Order No. 10,925.
40. 223 F. Supp. at 16.
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Cirthe plaintiffs under the Executive Order. On appeal, the Seventh
41
moot.
as
dismissal
for
case
the
remanded
and
cuit vacated
There were several teams of lawyers involved in the case below,
including a U.S. Attorney. It is an interesting period piece, a case of
first impression, and it illustrates the rudimentary state of the art in
1963. It is of little significance today, except as a case involving the
Executive Order in which plaintiffs obtained an injunction against continued discrimination by a union and an apprenticeship committee.
In Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc. 42 in 1967, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal for want of jurisdiction by a district court of an
individual's complaint against a government contractor. The Court of
Appeals disagreed with the court below regarding the lack of jurisdiction, but sustained the dismissal of the complaint. 4 3 Citing Farmer v.
PhiladelphiaElectric,44 it concluded that a private civil action was not a
permissible method of enforcing Executive Order 10,925. 45 It went on
to opine that were there an absence of any remedy save that which
might be fashioned under the general jurisdiction of the federal courts,
the inference would be strong that jurisdiction was intended to be invoked to give vitality to contractual assurances of nondiscrimination
but that was not the case. The court held that the plaintiff could have
taken his case to the President's Committee, 46 citing the complaint procedures of the then applicable rules and regulations. 47 In response to
the plaintiffs allegation that he sought the remedy before the Committee and that relief was refused, the court said that in light of the Executive Order's emphasis upon administrative methods, that refusal was
final. 48 The court cited for this proposition Switchmen's Union of North
America v. National Medical Board.49 (Switchmen's is, or was, the key
case regarding action committed to unreviewable agency discretion.)
The majority of the subsequent cases have held, virtually uniformly,
that there is no private right of action under the Executive Order
against a contractor.5 0
41. 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964).
42. 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
43. Id. at 634.
44. 329 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1964).
45. 375 F.2d at 632-33.
46. Id. at 633.
47. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.20-e through 60-1.27 (1961).
48. 375 F.2d at 633.
49. 320 U.S. 297 (1943). For a further discussion of agency discretion, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
50. See e.g., Cohen v. I.I.T., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976);
Cap v. Lehigh University, 433 F. Supp. 1275 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Gorman v. University of Miami, 414
F. Supp. 1022 (S.D. Fla. 1976); Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 405 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. Pa.
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In Hadnott v. Laird,5' in 1972, the same argument was tried again.
Plaintiffs sued the Secretary of Defense to enjoin the award of future
contracts to eleven textile companies who allegedly were guilty of discrimination and to require the government to terminate the existing
contracts until the discriminatory practices were eliminated. The district court dismissed the complaint on grounds of sovereign immunity
and failure of the plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies. 52 The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal on the failure to
exhaust theory and declined to address the sovereign immunity issue.
Both the trial judge and the majority (the decision was a two-to-one
vote) described in detail the administrative process under Executive
Order 11,246. 53 The Court of Appeals pointed out that nowhere in the
record was there an assertion that any of the plaintiffs had filed a complaint seeking to invoke the administrative process. 54 The majority of
the Court of Appeals refused to accept the plaintiffs claim that exhausting administrative remedies would have been futile. The court
concluded that because plaintiffs had not tried the administrative remedies, 55 there was no administrative record to review and that the ad1975); Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Rackin v. University of
Pennsylvania, 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 343 F. Supp.
836 (W.D. Pa. 1972), remandedon other grounds, 477 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973); Bradford v. People's
Natural Gas Company, 60 F.R.D. 432, 436 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Lewis v. FMC Corp., I I Fair Empl.
Prac. Cases (BNA) 31 (N.D. Cal. 1975). See also United States v. East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc., 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977), for the proposition that a union, not being a contractor
with the government, cannot be subject to an independent cause of action under the Executive
Order.
51. 463 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
52. 317 F. Supp. 379 (D.D.C. 1970).
53. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965). This order was the successor to Executive Order No. 10,925, 3
C.F.R. 448 (1961).
54. 463 F.2d at 307.
55. The plaintiffs' explanation of why pursuing the administrative route would be futile was
as follows in the court's language:
1) Principally plaintiffs claim that in the instances where the investigation has
been made and completed, and corrective action taken pursuant to a new, specific affirmative action agreement, the companies are still in violation. If this is true, there is nothing to preclude the plaintiffs from filing another complaint making such factual
assertions as they think can be established, and calling for a hearing on such complaint
in which the plaintiffs and witnesses offered by them may be allowed to participate.
2) Plaintiffs further assert that neither Executive Order 11,246 nor the regulations
provide an absolute right to the complainants or witnesses offered by them to participate
in such hearings, but the regulations do provide that if there is a hearing the individual
complainant may participate in the administrative hearing, if he can show he has an
interest in the proceeding and may contribute materially to the proper disposition
thereof. . . .

3) Plaintiffs further assert that in some (but not all) of the instances where revised
contractual obligations have been put into effect following the compliance investigation
triggered by the show-cause order, the new contracts have been refused to the plaintiffs
on the grounds that these agreements are confidential. Whether this is true or not, we
would assume that if a complaint were filed by the plaintiffs in regard to any one of these
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ministrative process should be pursued in such cases.5 6
The majority of the court strongly and clearly suggested that
plaintiffs could have obtained judicial review once there had been final
agency action. 57 It stated:
We cannot say with exactitude what will occur if plaintiffs go to the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance and file a complaint in each
of the eleven instances which they cited to the District Court and
now cite to this court. But we are assured that one of several things
will happen: (1) the Office of Federal Contract Compliance may actually reject the complaint on the ground that the matter has already
been investigated, compliance assured, and the matter closed; (2) the
OFCC may accept the complaint, reopen the investigation, but deny
plaintiffs any role in such investigation by offering testimony or
otherwise; or (3) the OFCC may reopen the investigation, conduct an
open hearing, in which plaintiffs are allowed to participate. In either
eventuality, the plaintiffs will have definite administrative action to
which to point when they then come into the United States District
Court for58review under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.

Although Hadnott is a powerful argument that judicial review is
available whenever the government process under the Executive Order
comes to a final halt, it did not deal with the current practice of referral
of individual complaints to EEOC.5 9 Under the facts of Hadnott, there
was no complaint to refer. If the present procedure had existed, since
there were over 100 named plaintiffs in Hadnott, it would not have
been a case appropriate for Office of Federal Contract Compliance
(OFCC). The court also suggested that if the agency violated its own
companies in this situation the contract provisions would be a matter of relevant evidence at the hearing.
463 F.2d at 307-08 (footnotes omitted).
56. 1d. at 308.
57. The plaintiffs' grievance might arise at any one of three stages: (1) Before any
OFCC consideration or action with respect to plaintiffs' complaints; (2) During OFCC
consideration or action; or (3) After OFCC consideration and action, in the form either
of a finding of no discriminatory practices or acceptance by a company or companies of
a compliance agreement, which plaintiffs find is insufficient or not being enforced. In
any of these cases, complainants should at first attempt to make full use of the administrative remedies explicitly designed to provide the kind of relief which they seek hereelimination of discriminatory practices on the part of the companies. Having once fully
but unsuccessfully pursued the available administrative remedies, plaintiffs would have exhausted them and they would pose no bar to judicial consideration of the plaintfffs
complaints.
(Emphasis in the original) 463 F.2d at 308, n. 12.
58. 463 F.2d at 308-09 (footnote omitted). In response to the plaintiffs' complaint that they
were not assured judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, the court cited Service
v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), as having determined otherwise. 463 F.2d at 309, n.13. But cf.
Farkas v. Texas Instrument Co., supra, note 41 and text accompanying notes 41-50.
59. 46 Fed. Reg. 7435 (1981), revising 39 Fed. Reg. 35,855 (1975), revising 35 Fed. Reg.
18,461 (1970). Even if it had been operative when Hadnott was litigated, according to the Court of
Appeals majority there would not have been a complaint for them to refer to EEOC.
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rules, judicial review of agency action might be obtained at some point
short of a debarment. 60 Chief District Judge Johnson wrote a dissent.
He noted that the majority failed to respond to the plaintiffs' contention
that the administrative remedies were ineffective and unavailing:
For example, it is clear from a reading of the regulations that under
either the Executive Order or Title VII, the plaintiffs could file complaints against the offending companies. This would not, however,
guarantee plaintiffs the right to participate in the agency proceedings,
although they may be permitted to do so. They have no control
whatever over the investigation or prosecution of the
action. They
61
must file the complaint and then hope for the best.
He also noted that past practice indicated that the federal defendants
were unlikely to take the actions which the plaintiffs desired, namely to
stop dealing with the discriminating companies until they were in compliance. 62 Judge Johnson correctly perceived that plaintiff, pre-Hadnott, could only file complaints and hope for the best. However, given
the majority opinion, the plaintiffs post-Hadnott could seek judicial review of OFCC's dismissal of the complaint or seek review at any point
63
when agency action is final.
Under the majority view in Hadnott, if the agency started hearings
and the plaintiffs were denied the right to participate, that denial would
be subject to judicial review. Recognizing the problems of reviewing
an action determined to be interlocutory, it would seem that after Hadnott in the District of Columbia prospects of success were good for
obtaining an injunction to prohibit an agency from conducting a hearing without the plaintiffs' full participation. The court might conclude,
however, that it would be too early to take such an action and delay
considering the case until the proceeding had run its course. In a posthearing judicial review on the merits, a court might conclude that the
plaintiffs had been sufficiently damaged by the denial of participation
60. A citation to Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), and a long discussion in footnote 13,
clearly suggested that the majority was inviting the parties to force the government to comply with
its own rules and regulations. 463 F.2d at 309.
It obviously took a Herculean effort as well as considerable time on the part of the Legal Aid
Society in Legal Aid Society v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), cert deniedsub. nom. 100
S. Ct. 3010 (1980), discussed, infra, text accompanying notes 175-201, to get the facts and analyze
and present them to the federal court. It is no wonder that representatives of minorities are distrustful of government officials who have operated these programs and therefore continue to seek
rules and regulations which lawyers can manipulate in the interests of their clients. However, only
the subsidized public interest law firms can pursue cases like Hadnott supra, note 9 and Legal Aid
Society v. Brennan. Hopefully, the need for this type of case is past. But where government
officials ignore their own regulations, the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576
(1976), and the Mandamus statute support a cause of action and some relief.
61. 463 F.2d at 313.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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in the hearing and vacate and remand for a proper hearing. Recognizing the uncertainty of these propositions, it seemed worth the effort of
organized civil rights advocates to have pursued the avenues which the
Hadnoll majority suggested were open to them.
The more difficult problem plaintiffs found was inaction on the
part of the agencies. The mandatory mediation and conciliation process lends itself to incremental offerings of change by the employers
which, if accepted by the agency, tend to compromise the validity of
the plaintiff's claim. Progress in the mediation and conciliation process
could be made merely by agreeing to, say, desegregation of facilities
such as showers, water fountains, time clocks, housing, etc. Any such
small movement has resulted in the government continuing to deal
with the offending contractors to the complete frustration of the civil
rights advocates and of the affected classes. While Hadnott established
the theoretical possibility of administrative relief and ultimate judicial
review, in reality the affected class plaintiff had little possibility of success unless a government agency started formal proceedings against a
contractor. The Labor Department had too little power over contracting agencies and did not have staff capability to litigate more than
a handful of OFCCP cases.64 The combined situation frustrated the
efforts of advocates on behalf of the affected class to get meaningful
relief under the Executive Order without intervention of some kind by
the courts.
In the earlier periods the government had neither the will nor the
confidence of success to seek specific enforcement of the contract. Even
if the Labor Department could have been persuaded to refer such matters to the Justice Department, Labor could not require Justice to litigate and, besides, Justice was a rather conservative litigant during the
early days. Moreover, the enforcement staff committed to these areas
in the Department of Justice was minimal at best. As for the legal authority to support specific enforcement of the contract, the Department
of Labor had neither the means nor the staff to do the necessary research to be persuasive. There was no law on point and memo writing
on "analogous law" can be most time-consuming. If the reader of such
a memo is looking for assurance of victory or excuses for inaction,
preparation of such memos is likely to be a fruitless venture. By contrast, where there is the will to act, supporting arguments can be found.
64. In re Bethlehem Steel Co., (OFCC Docket No. 102-68), alone took five years. More than
half the strike force of the Department of Labor lawyers was committed to that case at some time
during that period.
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The Executive Order itself is a prime example. 65
The pre-Hadnott plaintiffs also suffered from the informality of
the process. Rarely were complaints denied; they just did not get a
formal response. If the agency acted upon the complaint and initiated
a process of some sort, it often took into consideration many things not
of specific benefit to the plaintiffs and of which plaintiffs were not advised. The negotiations went on sporadically, and there was rarely any
formal indication that agency action was final. How could one get judicial review under such circumstances? It would only be in those rare
cases in which formal proceedings were triggered by the plaintiffs complaint that the Hadnott court's suggestions could have been meaningful
in any practical sense. Under the Hadnott theory, one would have been
able to seek review of a dismissal of a complaint; however, in practice,
that happened only when the Executive Order was clearly inapplicable.
In cases where jurisdiction under the Executive Order attached, the
complaint more likely went into a file and waited its turn for some type
of consideration, minimal or otherwise.
It is interesting to note that the Hadnott court ignored Farmer and
Farkas. In its refusal to entertain the plaintiffs' case, it emphasized the
availability of administrative remedies and subsequent judicial review.
Farkas, on the other hand, dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. To
the plaintiffs allegation that he had exhausted available remedies, the
Farkas court concluded that agency action refusing him relief was final
and unreviewable. Hadnott strongly suggests the contrary. 66 Are there
plausible explanations for these seeming variances between the Courts
of Appeals? I think there are. The trend in administrative law between
1967 (Farkas)and 1970 (Hadnott)shifted in favor of judicial review in
the manner suggested by the Hadnott court. The law of standing had
67
undergone rapid change starting with Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.
in 1968. The most significant developments were the 1970 cases, Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp6 8 and
Barlow v. Collins.69 These cases established that plaintiffs have stand65. See subsequent cases like United States v. New Orleans Public Service Inc., 553 F.2d 459
(5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 553 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1977); and
United States v. Duquesne Light Co., 423 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Pa. 1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 161-63 infra.
66. See 463 F.2d 304, at 308-09, notes 12 and 13 and accompanying text.
67. 390 U.S. 1 (1968). Hardin permitted standing to protect certain competitive interests; see
also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
68. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
69. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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ing if they are arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by
the statute and have suffered injury in fact. Perhaps as significant as
the standing cases were the views expressed by the Supreme Court in
Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner70 that only upon a showing of clear and
convincing evidence of contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review. Although that case involved a pre-enforcement challenge to a rule, it clearly foreshadowed the presumption
of reviewability of all final agency action. The 1970 standing cases
continued that trend particularly when participation in the administra'7 1
tive process was available to a "party in interest."
The loss in Hadnott actually amounted to a victory of sorts. The
dicta should have had greater impact on plaintiffs' access to judicial
review of administrative action under the Executive Order in view of
the fact that it was the thinking of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals, which presides over the seat of government. However, little use was made of it by civil rights advocates. One reason
seems obvious. The problem was to get the government agency to institute enforcement hearings. It was not clear from the dicta in Hadnott
that one could get the court to force the government to start the process,
although it can be read to invite judicial review of inaction. 72 However, Farkas was to the contrary; prosecutorial discretion provided
powerful arguments against the conclusion that the government's refusal to go forward at the behest of the plaintiff would be reviewable by
73
the courts.
Another possible explanation for the failure to pursue the suggestion of judicial review was the limited resources of civil rights advocates. 74 The government's program emphasis shifted to the construction
industry, or at least its efforts in that industry caught the public attention. Thus, civil rights advocates had to respond to that shift or risk
75
being left out of the only game in town.
70. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
71. See also Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where the
second lowest bidder who lost out on a contract had standing to challenge the inappropriate grant
of the contract to another.
72. 463 F.2d at 308-09, n. 12.
73. See e.g., Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
74. The possibility of attorney's fees for work done in the administrative process in civil
rights cases arose much later in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 100 S.Ct. 2024 (1980). It
is not clear whether such fees are available for going through the administrative process under the
Executive Order. See note 218, infra.
75. I do not suggest that these were the only activities. I suggest that the attention they
received from the executive, Congress, and the courts and the attacks by contractors and unions,
dictated participation by civil rights groups, even if only on an amicus basis. The limited re-
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Pre-EnforcementJudicialReview of Agency Action Under the
Executive Order
The first case on record in which a contractor sued the government
under the Executive Order program occurred quite late (1968) in the
post-1961 period. That should come as no surprise since the government's first efforts were devoted to what has been referred to as the
"Jawbone Phase," and contractors had little need to resort to the
courts. 76 It was only when the government indicated it would act contrary to contractors' interests that cases started to arise. The first such
77
case was Crown Zellerbach Corporation v. Wirtz.
As might be expected, efforts by contractors to obtain pre-enforcement review by federal courts of agency action under the Executive
Order met with early success. In the Crown Zellerbach case, the Secretary of Labor was enjoined from debarring a contractor by direct or
indirect means (formal debarment, temporary suspension or otherwise)
without first affording the contractor an opportunity for a hearing. In
anticipation that contracting agencies would be ordered to withhold
any new business from the company without first clearing the new contract with the Department of Labor, Crown Zellerbach successfully
sought the assistance of the court. OFCC and Crown Zellerbach were
deadlocked over the continuation of a seniority system which locked in
incumbent Blacks. All attempts to modify that system had been rejected by the union representing the company's employees. The court's
order left the Department of Labor with no alternative but to retreat or
to institute enforcement hearings prior to the institution of sanctions.
The company, after its victory, capitulated. The union announced its
intent to strike, whereupon the government successfully sought injunctive relief in a district court in New Orleans, 78 and the Crown
Zellerbach case became relatively unimportant.
None of the problems which affected class plaintiffs had encountered in seeking court assistance arose in the Crown Zellerbach case.
Contractors, being in privity of contract with the government (under
ordinary procurement law), had long enjoyed the right to seek court
assistance. 79 Whether they had to exhaust administrative remedies
sources which were at their disposal probably dictated that other activities be reduced to accommodate these initiatives.
76. See Jones, FederalContract Compliancein Phase l-The Dawning of the Age of Enforcement of EqualEmployment Obligations, 4 GA. L. REV. 756 (1970).
77. 281 F. Supp. 337 (D.D.C. 1968).
78. United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 301 F. Supp. 906 (E.D.
La.), aJ'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
79. See e.g., Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
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would also be determined by procurement law principles. If one concludes, as Judge Sirica did in Crown Zellerbach, that the threatened
action amounted to a cancellation, termination, or debarment, or other
sanction against the contractor, it is easy to justify injunctive relief.
The government was failing to comply with its own rules and the Executive Order. If one concludes, however, that an order not to enter into
new contracts with a contractor who seems to be defaulting on existing
contracts until the issue of default is determined is not a sanction, then
an injunction that required the government to throw good money after
bad would seem contrary to good business sense. After all, the contractors do not have an unlimited right to do business with the
government.80
Rather than appeal the case, however, the government counterattacked. In United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers and
Paperworkers,81 and Crown Zellerbach Corp.82, the government sought
an injunction against the union's interference with the company's contractual obligations under Executive Order 11,246 as well as an action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.83 This case came to be
a celebrated seniority case, but it also was the first successful effort of
the government to establish the enforceability of the Executive Order
and as such contributed to confidence in the viability of administrative
enforcement.
During the year after the Crown Zellerbach v. Wirtz decision, the
first ever notices of proposed debarment through the administrative
process were issued. 84 Of the first seven instances in which the Labor
Department issued notices of proposed debarment, three of the cases
Gonzalas v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Gantt and Panzer, The Government Blacklist:
Debarment and Suspension of Bidders on Government Contracts, 25 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175
(1956); Miller, Administrative Discretion in the Award of Federal Contracts, 53 MICH. L. REV. 781
(1955); Note, The Blacklisted Contractor and the Question of Standing to Sue, 56 Nw. U. L. REV.
811 (1962); Note, Notice and Hearing in Government Exclusionary Action, I10 U. PA. L. REV. 1009
(1962).
80. Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368, 370-71 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
This article is not an essay on the government procurement process, and these "nice issues" are
beyond the scope of this discussion.
81. 290 F.2d 368.
82. 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968).
83. See also 301 F.Supp. 906 (E.D. La. 1969), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970).
84. See Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort, 1970 U.S. Civil Rights Commission Report,
163-165, n. 220, and 214-216 (Government Printing Office); see also In re Allen Bradley Co.,
OFCC Docket No. 101-68; In re Bethlehem Steel Co., OFCC Docket No. 102-68; In re Timken
Roller Bearing Co., OFCC Docket No. 100-68, File, U.S. Department of Labor, OFCCP. Debarment notices also went to: B & P Motor Express, Pullman Standard, Inc., Hennis Freight Lines,
and Bemis Co.
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went to hearing. The first involved the Allen Bradley Co. in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. As an indication of the state of the art of administrative enforcement at that time, before the Allen Bradley case could
proceed to hearing, the Department of Labor had to write rules and
regulations under which one could conduct a trial. 85 41 C.F.R. § 601.26 of the rules and regulations, in effect at the time these cases were
noticed for trial, only provided certain minimal procedural due process
rights. Although new sets of rules and regulations were issued by the
Labor Department to become effective July 1, 1968, they provided no
better procedures for trial than those which they replaced. 86 In the first
few cases, rules of practice were issued with each notice of debarment.
Some parties complained during the hearings about the lack of published rules of procedure, but with little effect.
The early ad hoc rules of practice made use of hearing panels and,
despite reservations raised by the legal staff, utilized labor arbitrators as
panel members. Given the emphasis in the conventional wisdom (and
by 1964 in Title VII itself) on mediation and conciliation, the earlier
enforcement process tended to reflect the more informal attitudes of
grievance arbitration than the formalities of the administrative process
or formal litigation.
It now seems surprising that a program could exist from 1961 to
197287 without uniform, published procedures governing trial practice.
That the program survived without this is probably due to the limited
use made of the enforcement hearing process and, perhaps, because the
ad hoc rules were reasonably adequate. Finally, in 1977, the rules of
practice were published8 8 and are now codified in 41 C.F.R. § 60-30.
With the promulgation of uniform rules of practice in 197289 and in the
current rules, 90 the full panoply of rules of practice, recognizable as
such by lawyers familiar with the administrative law and practice, 9 ' has
85. 33 Fed. Reg. 10,479 (1968). The notice ofln Re Allen Bradley Co., stated that the hearing
would be conducted "in accordance with rules of procedure which are available at Room 4136,
14th and Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C.
86. See 33 Fed. Reg. 7804 (1968).
87. 37 Fed. Reg. 20,536, (1972), revised in 43 Fed. Reg. 49,240 (1978).
88. Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort, 1977, 67-76, 42 Fed. Reg. 3452 (1977). (The
rules in 43 Fed. Reg. 49,240 were published pursuant to President Carter's consolidation plan to
clarify the results of consolidation. The changes made from 42 Fed. Reg. 3462 were not "significant or major.")
89. 37 Fed. Reg. 20,536 (1972).
90. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,240 (Oct. 20, 1978), 41 C.F.R. § 60-30.
91. PART 60-30-RULES OF PRACTICE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
i 1,246
General Provisions
Sec.
60-30.1

Applicability of rules.

60-30.2

Waiver, modification.
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been provided. It should be noted that the informal panels have been
replaced by administrative law judges and panels are not used.
While these new rules do not specifically provide for judicial review, it is clear that the process is similar to a multitude of other administrative processes whereby the authorizing statutes provide for
judicial review. It is also clear that records made pursuant to these
rules follow familiar patterns which will facilitate court review in accordance with normal standards of review of administrative agency

action.
60-30.3
60-30.4
60-30.5
60-30.6
60-30.7
60-30.8
60-30.9
60-30.10
60-30.11
60-30.12
60-30.13
Sec.
60-30.15
60-30.16
60-30.17
60-30.18
60-30.19
60-30.20
60-30.21
60-30.22
60-30.23
60-30.24
60-30.25
60-30.26
60-30.27
60-30.28
60-30.29
60-30.30

Computation of time.
Form, filing, service of pleadings and papers.
Prehearing Procedures
Administrative complaint.
Answer.
Notice of prehearing conference.
Motions; disposition of motions.
Interrogatories, and admissions as to facts and documents.
Production of documents and things and entry upon land for inspection and
other purposes.
Depositions upon oral examination.
Prehearing conferences.
Consent findings and order.
Hearings and Related Matters
Authority and responsibilities of Administrative Law Judges.
Appearances.
Appearance of witnesses.
Evidence; testimony.
Objections; exceptions; offer of proof.
Ex Parte communications.
Oral argument.
Official transcript.
Summary judgment.
Participation by interested persons.
Post Hearing Procedures
Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Record for recommended decision.
Recommended decision.
Exceptions to recommended decisions.
Record.
Final Administrative Order.
Expedited Hearing Procedures

Sec.
60-30.31 Expedited hearings-when appropriate.
60-30.32 Administrative complaint and answer.
60-30.33 Discovery.
60-30.34 Conduct of hearing.
60-30.35 Recommended decision after hearing.
60-30.36 Exceptions to recommendations.
60-30.37 Final Administrative Order.
AUTHORITY: Secs. 201, 205, 208, 209, 301, 302(b) and 303(a) of the Executive
Order 11,246, as amended, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319; 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303; sec. 60-1.26 of this
chapter (41 C.F.R. § 60-1), as amended by E.O. 12,086.
SOURCE: 43 Fed. Reg. 49,259, Oct. 20, 1978, unless otherwise noted.
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Recall, if you will, the discussion in Hadnott v. Laird92 of the justification for requiring exhaustion of administrative procedures in Executive Order cases. The Hadnott court seemed to assume that standard
administrative practice and concepts of administrative law would govern both the process within the agencies as well as the conduct of the
court. It should be noted that in 1970 when Hadnott was decided, the
full impact of cases like Barlow v. Collins,9 3 Data Processing Service
Organizations,Inc. v. Camp 9 4 and Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner95
had not been felt within the various executive agencies of the federal
96
government.
The Exhaustion Requirementfor JudicialReview-Application of a
Sound Policy or Pursuitof a Non-existing Remedy?
Early on, the courts agreed that they had jurisdiction of cases arising under the Executive Order even where they found the plaintiffs had
97
no cause of action.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals had a second opportunity to express itself regarding the Executive Order program in the 1972
case of Freeman v. Shultz. 9 8 In Freeman, nineteen employees brought a
class action against the Secretary of Labor seeking to enjoin federal
contracts to Grumman Aerospace Corporation for alleged racial discrimination. They also sought a declaration that the continuing contracts violated Executive Order 11,246, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
92. See text accompanying notes 21-64, supra.
93. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
94. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
95. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
96. It was clear to administrative lawyers that the new presumption of reviewability and the
new standing rule would have significant impact on those administrative agencies which were
established by statute. However, it was not apparent that the legion of activities established by
Executive Order or by agencies would also come under court scrutiny in due time. The Executive
branch did not fully appreciate that the new trend toward reviewability would require it to pay
more attention to administrative rules. Whether the Administrative Procedure Act itself provided
jurisdiction for judicial review and what the limits of administrative discretion were were issues
very much in a state of flux during the late 60's and early 70's.
Certainly since 1977 we expect no problem with judicial review of OFCCP action. Califano
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), makes it clear, if it were not clear before, that the Administrative
Procedure Act, while not providing an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, reflected
congressional intent that judicial review should be widely available. 430 U.S. at 104. Moreover,
the 1976 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (the federal question jurisdiction) which eliminated the
requirement for any specific monetary amount in an action brought against the United States, an
agency, officer or employee thereof, conferred jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action. The new OFCC rules clearly evidence an administrative intent that judicial review was
anticipated.
97. See Farkas and Farmer, discussed in text accompanying notes 38 and 42, supra.
98. 468 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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of 1964, 99 and the due process clause of the Constitution. The district
court dismissed the action on the grounds of sovereign immunity and
failure of the plaintiffs to exhaust the administrative remedies.' °° The
court of appeals declined to decide the sovereign immunity issue,
which was the grounds for the district court's dismissal, but affirmed on
the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.' 0 '
In Freeman, unlike in Hadnou, the plaintiffs had lodged an informal complaint with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. In partial response thereto, a compliance review of the company's equal
employment opportunity obligations had been conducted. Moreover,
the Defense Supply Agency, which was the compliance agency under
the existing procedures, had determined that the company was not in
compliance with the requirements of Executive Order 11,246. Negotiations between the company and the Office of Compliance of the Defense Supply Agency eventually resulted in an agreement to correct
deficiencies in the company's employment practices and to file an acceptable affirmative action plan. After this was done, the company was
found to be in compliance with the Executive Order. 0 2 The court
noted that after the agreement the plaintiffs never formally or informally complained regarding the company's discriminatory practices
but rather filed a suit directly in federal court. The court went on to
opine that the case was controlled by Hadnott v. Laird.10 3 The plaintiffs attempted to distinguish this case on the ground that they had informally complained and pursued administrative remedies which
turned out to be inadequate. Since the remedies did not deal with the
problem raised in the complaint, the plaintiffs contended that further
resort to the administrative process should not be required before they
could go to the federal courts. The court of appeals did not find this
distinction persuasive.' ° 4
It did note, however, that it was not necessary for a complaint to
be filed for a compliance review to be done. The general reviews which
the government might conduct were not limited or directed toward investigating the grievances of any particular group of persons. This did
not limit OFCC's formal complaint process in any particular fashion.
The court recognized that a specific investigation to address individual
99.
100.
101.
102.,
103.
104.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974e (1964).
317 F. Supp. 376 (D.D.C. 1970).
468 F.2d at 124.
468 F.2d at 121.
Id. at 122.
468 F.2d at 122.
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complaints was different from the general review which the government had conducted in this case.105 In requiring the individuals to exhaust the administrative process despite the fact that their informal
efforts had triggered or contributed to a compliance review, the court
was making a clear distinction between the general compliance process
and the individual complaint resolution process, which is now codified
06
in the memorandum of agreement between OFCCP and EEOC.
Plaintiffs could have instigated an investigation of their grievances,
but they chose not to do so. Since the general investigation that was
conducted was not specifically directed at the evils alleged by the specific plaintiffs, the company was not directly confronted with their
charge until the lawsuit had been filed and had no opportunity to explain or respond to those allegations. The court declared it both fundamentally illogical and unfair to contend that there had been a complete
investigation of an accusation, when the accused has not been afforded
an opportunity to hear and answer the charges.' 0 7 It postulated three
fundamental reasons why a formal complaint is needed in a case such
as this:
First, a complaint is needed to focus the attention of the agency.
The obligation of the Office of Compliance is to see that the company
fulfills its equal employment duties in all of its operations. It cannot
be expected to address itself to alleged discriminatory practices on
the basis of informal comments and allegations. Secondly, a formal
complaint is necessary to tell the accused company what is allegedly
wrong. Without this the accused cannot be expected to answer the
allegations, and thereby completely illuminate the matter. Finally, a
formal complaint is needed so that a record can be created regarding
the specific allegations and in order to establish conclusively what, if
anything, was done to remedy them. Even if a formal charge is made
and the Office of Compliance does nothing,0 that
is a matter of record
8
which can be corrected by judicial action.1
In its final preachment the court urged the parties to utilize the
administrative procedure provided under the Executive Order as well
as the processes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.109
In addition to foreshadowing the separation of compliance reviews
and individual complaints, the D.C. Circuit Court, in Freeman v.
Shultz, made it clear that if the government does nothing in response to
a formal complaint, its non-action would be subject to judicial review.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Memo of agreement re: referral to EEOC, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,855 (1975).
468 F.2d at 123.
Id. at 123-24.
468 F.2d at 124.
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It is also noteworthy that both Hadnott and Freeman involved substantial numbers of individuals, 0 each of whom represented a potential
OFCCP complaint. Under current practices, cases such as these involving substantial numbers of individuals should be retained by
OFCCP for processing. Systemic complaints should trigger the
OFCCP enforcement process leading to corrections or sanctions. As a
practical matter, the first thing that would occur would be an investigation, and, normally, the procedure which would follow would be not
unlike that in Freeman v. Shultz where an agreement was reached and
no formal hearing held. " 'I Is the court suggesting that had these parties
filed a formal piece of paper and had this case then gone exactly the
same way, that it would then be ripe for judicial review? What then
would be before the court? Obviously the same thing that the plaintiffs
were attacking, namely the adequacy of the agreement which the Government accepted.
The distinction which the court draws between the compliance review process and response to an individual complaint in Freeman v.
Shultz was accidental. In fact, the practice in the early days, which is
now codified in the OFCCP Rules and Regulations, required the affected class issues to be resolved before any conciliation agreement was
reached with the company. Under that practice, no matter what triggered the compliance review, violations were to be adjusted before
agreements were reached. At the very least, provisions or agreements
to correct violations were extracted in order to continue the contracting.
The problem then was that federal agencies, which had the primary
responsibility for enforcement of the Executive Order, very often accepted "soft" settlements and refused to respond to OFCC's demands
for more adequate and complete relief before reaching agreement. It is
this problem which the plaintiffs in both Hadnott and Freeman unsuccessfully sought to attack.
If we take the court's opinion at face value, had the employees
filed a formal complaint and had the process gone exactly as it went in
Freeman, they would have been in a position to insist that the court
grant judicial review. It is the quality of the settlement which the government had accepted which would have been before the court for review. It is not clear from this case that the court would, in 1972, have
reviewed that judgment. The D.C. Court discussed resort to the ad110. Hadnou had a hundred and fifteen named plaintiffs in the beginning and Freeman had
nineteen.
111. Memo of agreement re: referral to EEOC, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,855 (1975).
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ministrative process but did not address the statement in Farkas that if
the process were resorted to, had been fully exhausted, and the government had made certain judgments in accepting settlements, then those
judgments would be unreviewable.
This was probably the critical point for civil rights advocates from
public interest law firms. It is one thing to fashion individual relief for
specific individuals, whether they be 19 or 115 strong; it is another
thing to order the government to require the company to clean up its
act completely or face debarment. It is judicial oversight over this systemic process through the initiative of the civil rights advocates that
was the critical issue in Hadnott and Freeman. It may still be the issue
which separates those advocates who accept the deferral of individual
complaints to EEOC and those who would require the use of the administrative enforcement process of the Executive Order. What they
have yet to get the courts to focus on is, can the representatives of the
affected classes hold the government accountable for the quality of the
settlements it is accepting, or the decisions it makes to prosecute or not
to prosecute, when the ultimate relief is complete eradication of discrimination as perceived by the affected class representatives or the imposition of the sanctions of cancellation, termination or debarment?
We will discuss LegalAid Society v. Brennan,112 but that case does not
provide us with an answer to this more narrow issue, namely, what
about the review of the settlement "compromise"?
On the issue of whether the parties will ultimately be able to attack
the agreement between the two agencies that individual cases be deferred to EEOC and class complaints be retained by OFCCP, Hadnott
has language which will certainly be pertinent to any such challenge.
The court said:
Our conclusion that plaintiffs should not be permitted to initiate
an original court action, demanding the remedy of government contract termination with all companies found racially discriminating in
employment practices, with the remedy derived directly from the due
process clause, is reinforced by the existence of still another remedy
to vindicate their rights unresorted to by plaintiffs. Recognizing that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not an exclusive remedy,
and that the action is brought directly against the offending company
rather than against government officials as plaintiffs have done here,
still, if plaintiffs are interested in securing equal employment opportunities with private companies instead of litigating with government
officials, this is precisely the purpose for which Title VII was
112. 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979) cert. denied sub. nom. 100 S. Ct. 3010 (1980).
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designed. 113
One can infer that the court would favor referral of individual complaints to EEOC rather than forcing OFCCP to process them. Perhaps
that conclusion really expresses a bias against the theory of the case
brought in Hadnott. The court may have thought that it was an attempt to base action too broadly on the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. However that may be, the decision expresses a preference
for resort to the existing statute and to judicial review of administrative
actions rather than to direct suits against the government.
It would seem that if a challenge to the OFCC agreement to defer
informal cases to EEOC were made in the District of Columbia, both
Freeman v. Shultz and Hadnott v. Laird could be relied on as support
for the agreement. It seems unlikely that the court would rule as impermissible the government's attempt to allocate the resources of two
agencies with overlapping authority. This is particularly so in view of
the general acceptance of prosecutorial discretion. The deferral agreement raises two important policy questions. As a policy matter, why
should OFCC not be required to prosecute individual complaints while
at the same time being allowed substantial, if not complete, discretion
in accepting settlements of valid discrimination claims? It is easy to
defend the reasonableness of the EEOC/OFCC deferral agreement as
an allocation of resources for economic efficiency, but what about its
effectiveness if compliance with the Executive Order is the goal?
Obviously some civil rights advocates would prefer that every opportunity for enforcement of the Executive Order be pursued by the
government, but that is not a realistic expectation. If each complaint
were pursued, it is unlikely that the courts would sustain the imposition
of sanctions of debarment, cancellation or termination of a government
contract for one, or a few, violations of individual rights. Given most
of the history of Executive Order enforcement during which the imposition of sanctions for violation of individual rights was rare indeed, it
is not likely that the courts would require such sanctions, even though
they might permit them in appropriate cases.
Public interest law firms and other such institutional civil rights
lawyers are-understandably--dissatisfied with any deferral policy in
which all individual complaints go to EEOC as it limits their opportunity to force the government to act. Such a policy gives them less control over OFCC's allocation of its enforcement resources. It also gives
the agency wider enforcement latitude without the possibility of judi113. 463 F.2d at 311 (footnotes omitted).
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cial oversight. Public interest actions are still viable under a deferral
policy, certainly in those cases in which the government's misfeasance
is systemic such as in Legal Aid Society v. Brennan,'14 discussed here
later. Even informal agency decisions should be reviewable by the
courts for rationality."15
EVIDENCE OF THE ARRIVAL AT THE THRESHOLD
OF ADMINISTRATIVE MATURITY
In this section I will attempt to illustrate through selected cases
that the administrative process under the Executive Order has finally
arrived at the threshold of what I refer to as "maturity of the administrative process." I say threshold because we still have a few years to go
before we can make a final judgment. However, we are now in a position where we have a full set of rules and regulations and case law
upon which to build. By the end of the 80's, enforcement of the Executive Order could be as orderly and predictable as the processes of the
National Labor Relations Board. If that analogy holds, we should also
see a continuation and perhaps even an increase in settlements without
resort to the formal administrative process. This might lead the civil
rights advocates to complain that we have come full circle, since the
early experience under the Executive Order was all settlement and no
enforcement. Obviously that is not the ideal mature administrative
process. It may well be that for that reason we will still see efforts to
retain an outside check in the hands of representatives of the affected
classes.
Pre-enforcement challenges to a program occur most frequently
during its early stages before its validity has been authoritatively established. Once the legitimacy of the fundamental elements of a program
have sufficient court endorsement, attacks tend to focus on its administrative regularity. In this context, ContractorsAssociation of Eastern
Pennsylvania v. The Secretary of Labor,'16 decided in 1970, will probably go down in history as the most significant case of the modern Exec114. 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979).
115. The APA requires courts to set aside agency action that are arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion. 5 USC § 706(2)(A) (1976). The Supreme Court has said this requires a
searching and careful inquiry by the reviewing court. Thus, the informal administrative record
must be subject to judicial oversight. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978). See also Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE
L. REV. 38, at 62-64 (1975).
116. 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970), afftd, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1971).
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utive Order era." 7 There are a multitude of reasons for this
assessment: first, the case established the validity, not only of Executive Order 11,246, but of the affirmative action concept which prior to
this case had little content and no clear definition; second, it encouraged the government to devise and ultimately to issue Order
Number 4,118 which applied affirmative action obligations to most contractors subject to the Executive Order rather than merely to construction contractors."i 9 These two factors enabled the government to shift

its emphasis to attempts to monitor overall compliance and to focus on
underutilization of minorities without being limited to cases of specific
acts of discrimination against individuals. 20 The numerical goals and
timetables requirements gave the government a management tool
whereby the contractor's performance of the undertaking to assure affirmative action could be measured and evaluated. This more objective
measurement of progress, or lack thereof, was perceived as increasing
the likelihood of hearings leading to the imposition of sanctions because it facilitated proof of non-performance of affirmative action.
With the affirmative action concept validated by a court of appeals
opinion, the Department of Labor was more confident that the general
affirmative action requirements would also be sustained. Challenges to
the goals and timetables concept have continued largely without success. The Supreme Court so far has refused to review any of the contractor cases in which the validity of the Executive Order had been
12
challenged and upheld.
Probably the most interesting issue of administrative law involved
117. Id. The author confesses some bias regarding this judgment because of personal involvement in development of the Philadelphia plan and the devising of the legal theory in support
thereof.
118. Eventually codified in 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1972).
119. For discussions of the Philadelphia Plan, see e.g., Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment
Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 341, [Hereinafter Bugaboo]; Comment, The PhiladelphiaPlan: A Study
in the Dynamics of Executive Power [Hereinafter Philadelphia Plan], 39 U. CH. L. REV. 723
(1972).
120. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise.- Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 65-74 (1972), discussing the three types of employment discrimination and definitions. See Bugaboo, note 117, supra.
121. See e.g., Detroit Police Officers Association v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3931 (June 15, 1981); EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); EEOC v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local Union
No. 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976); Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v.
Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974) and cases cited therein. But
see Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,233 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3055 (1980) dismissed 101 S. Ct. 2211 (1981); Cf. Regents of
the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980).
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in the revised Philadelphia Plan 122 is the conceptual nature of the plan.
The plaintiffs sought without success to challenge its validity because of
an alleged procedural irregularity. They claimed, among other things,
that the plan constituted general rule making and, having been issued
by an Assistant Secretary of Labor, was in violation of Executive Order
11,246, which reserved general rule making for the Secretary of Labor.12 3 The circuit court of appeals brushed this argument aside concluding that the plan was not a general rule but was based upon
findings as to available construction manpower in a specific labor market. 124 The "rule or order" issued under the APA did not preoccupy
125
the court at all.

The Mark of Maturity
While one or two or three swallows do not make a spring, the two
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall 26 cases and St. Regis Paper Company v.
Marshall127 are significant harbingers that spring may not be far off.
With increasing authority sustaining the validity of the Executive Or122. See, e.g., Bugaboo and Philadelphia Plan, note 117 supra.
123. See Executive Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339, § 401 (1965).
124. Contractors Association of Eastern Pa. v. Sec. of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 176 (3rd Cir. 1971).
125. It is also worth noting that the process which proceeded issuance of this revised plan was
not adjudication. The Administrative Procedure Act definition of a rule is broad enough to encompass the Philadelphia Plan. The order embodying the plan was certainly an agency action of
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement the Executive Order; thus, the
APA definition of an order could be applicable. But if so, then the process for the formulation of
an order is by definition "adjudication". The due process requirements for adjudication, as well
as the standards of judicial review, are different from the requirements for the promulgation of a
rule. In the Philadelphia Plan case the court seemed to have treated the plan as a rule. In any
event, it could be subject to judicial review. See e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136 (1967); see also NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
5 U.S.C. § 551 (4):
"rule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or
describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial
structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances
therefore or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the
foregoing;
5 U.S.C. § 551 (6):
"order" means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative,
injunctive or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but
including licensing;
5 U.S.C. § 551 (7):
"adjudication" means agency process for the formulation of an order.
5 U.S.C. § 551 (4), (6), (7) (1976 & Sup. IV. 1980).
126. 579 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1978). This is Uniroyal 1. Uniroyal 2 is at 20 Empl. Prac. Dec.
30,109, 30,108, 30,109 (CCH) (D.D.C. and D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Firestone v. Marshall, 24
Fair Empl. Practices Cases 1694, 23 Fair Empl. Practices Cases 215, 526 (BNA) (E.D. Tex. 1980).
127. 591 F.2d 612 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 826, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979).
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der, contractors turned to litigation to challenge the administration of
the program. The resulting cases are revealing the contours of the administrative law of the Executive Order program and provide further
evidence of what I have labeled the maturation of the administrative
enforcement process.
In the first Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 28 the company sought to
challenge the validity of OFCC's pre-hearing discovery rules and administrative subpoenas 29 on the ground that the rules were not specifically authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act, 130 Executive
Order 11,246, or the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act. ' 3 ' The company also alleged that the government's attempt to terminate its contracts for non-compliance with the rules deprived it of
property rights protected by the fifth amendment to the Constitution.
When this case arose in January 1976, the Department of Interior
was the compliance agency. It had conducted an onsight review of one
of the company's plants and found a number of deficiencies. The deficiencies included failure to supply complete and accurate data to investigators, failure to identify areas where women and minorities were
under-utilized, failure to set goals and timetables for an affirmative action program, and assignment of women and minorities to lower paying jobs. The Interior Department issued a 30-day notice to show
cause why proceedings leading to sanctions should not be instituted.
Negotiations for settlement failed and the government issued a formal
complaint which commenced the administrative process. The case was
set for hearing before an administrative law judge.
During the pre-hearing discovery phase, Uniroyal was uncooperative; its refusal to comply with orders of the administrative law judge
prompted the government's motion to compel discovery. The government moved to terminate its contracts and debar the company from
future contracts for its failure to engage in discovery. The hearing was
expanded to consider whether Uniroyal's refusal to engage in pre-hearing discovery was violative of the Executive Order and grounds for
sanctions. Uniroyal sued in the federal district court seeking to bar
enforcement of the rules, to enjoin any administrative hearing, and to
bar the government from imposing any sanctions for its non-compliance with the pre-hearing discovery rules. It sought a declaratory judgment that the said rule was an unconstitutional exercise of government
128.
129.
130.
131.

579 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1978).
41 C.F.R. §§ 60-30.1, 60-30.9 through 60-30.11, and 60-30.17 (1980).
5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1976).
40 U.S.C. § 486 (1976).
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authority. Ultimately the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on grounds of no showing of irreparable
harm and of failure to exhaust administrative procedures. It stated that
the case met none of the requirements for pre-enforcement review of
agency action and was not ripe for judicial review. Moreover, the court
held that the rules were valid contract terms neither in conflict with nor
in excess of the Executive Order's authority. On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit denied Uniroyal's motion for an injunction against proceeding
with the administrative hearing. 32 The court of appeals affirmed the
court below on the "failure to exhaust" theory without deciding on the
validity of the rules. It found that Uniroyal's case did not come within
the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. 33 The administrative
hearing on the merits was concluded and a final order was issued on
June 28, 1979.134
In the second Uniroyal,Inc. v. Marshall, 35 the company got a temporary restraining order in the District Court of the District of Columbia on July 2, 1979, barring any action by the government in the matter
of Department of Labor v. Uniroyal until approved by the court. On
July 20, the court sustained the Department of Labor, holding that Executive Order 11,246 and the implementing regulations under challenge were valid and that Uniroyal was properly debarred from present
and future contracts for violation of the discovery regulations. The
authority to impose sanctions under the Executive Order extended not
only to the substantive nondiscrimination provisions, but also to discovery and inspection orders.136 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia denied the company's requests for an injunction pending
appeal of the district court's decision. 37 Subsequently, Uniroyal and
the Department of Labor reached an agreement on the matters in dispute, and the appeal was dismissed without opinion based on the joint
38
stipulation of the parties.'
St. Regis Paper Co. v. Marshall 39 is another case which I believe
portends increasing maturity in administrative law under Executive
Order 11,246. In a compliance review, the government found that the
St. Regis Company had deviated from its affirmative action plan in the
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

579 F.2d at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
In the Matter of Department of Labor and Uniroyal, No. OFCCP 1977-1.
482 F. Supp. 364 (D.D.C. 1979).
Id. at 367.
Uniroyal v. Marshall, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 30,109 (BNA) (D.C. Cir. 1979).
22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,889 (BNA) (1980).
591 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1979).
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employment of women. A notice to show cause under the rules was
issued and the parties proceeded to negotiations on corrective measures. The company's proposals were rejected by the government.
When the company brought an action in the district court, it was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative procedures. The company
appealed, arguing that its action was excepted from the exhaustion requirement on one or more of the following grounds:
1. The complaint raises important questions of law involving
statutory interpretation and the constitutionality of regulations, which
are within the expertise of courts rather than agencies.
2. Review by the agency would be expensive and fruitless, since
the agency is not likely to void its own regulations.
3. Agency rules constitute "final agency action" subject to preenforcement court review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
4. Plaintiff is prejudiced by the administrative delay in that it is
subject to further show cause notices at its other facilities and is subject
to defacto debarment nationally by virtue of the Libby show cause
notice.
5. If plaintiff loses at the administrative level it will likely be permanently debarred with no assurance of being granted a stay pending
court review. 4 0
CitingAbbot Laboratoriesv. Gardner,'4' the Tenth Circuit rejected
the plaintiff's arguments, noting that agency action must not only be
final to be properly reviewable, but also that the controversy must be
ripe. 142 It also cited Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner,'43 for the
proposition that agency review of challenged regulations is desirable,
even where pure questions of law are concerned, in order to provide the
court with the agency's considered views and to preserve the opportunity for the agency to correct an ill-conceived regulation and moot the
issue without judicial interference.'
The court opined that "[t]he desirability of full agency consideration is particularly great where, as
here, the plaintiff's challenge is to the regulation as applied to a specific
set of facts, as well as on its face, so that ultimate judicial review, if
necessary, will be facilitated by a complete administrative record.' 145
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

591
387
591
387
591
Id.

F.2d
U.S.
F.2d
U.S.
F.2d

at 614.
136, 149 (1967).
at 615.
158 (1967).
at 614.
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The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 146
In Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Marshall,'47 a contractor challenged
an OFCCP rule which, in effect, permitted debarment until disputed
matters were resolved. 148 Contractors so affected could be determined
non-responsible bidders or designated non-awardable. With such a
cloud upon them, another regulation disabled them from bidding on
future contracts. In this case, the company's name also appeared on a
list which was published and circulated.
The Seventh Circuit held that, before the hearing on the merits at
which a contractor may be found guilty of noncompliance with the order, the government may not take any action which debars, or has the
effect of debarring, that contractor from government contracts. This
decision was grounded on the determination that the rule permitting
such action violated the Executive Order. 49 No issue of exhaustion of
remedies was raised. The court also held that Section 209 of Executive
Order 11,246 permitted publication of a contractor's name as not being
in compliance only when the government made such a finding after an
opportunity for a hearing.1 50 The court found valid a government regulation which provided that a contractor is not in compliance as long as
he has an unremedied "affected class" problem but held that a hearing
is required to determine whether such a problem exists. 15 1 It further
held that Section 209 of the Executive Order permitted publication of
the names of non-complying contractors only after hearings on the
52
merits. 1
In every case in which government sanctions have been imposed
without a hearing and have been challenged, the government has lost.
The government has, as Illinois Tool reports, discontinued all practices
which have been successfully attacked as defacto debarments without
prior hearings. The proposed rules of OFCCP will eliminate the
problem.153
146. 444 U.S. 828, reh'g. denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979).
147. 601 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1979).
148. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.2(b) (1976) authorized a government contracting officer, before a hearing, to declare a contractor non-responsible and ineligible for government contracts if the officer is
informed through sources within any government agency that the contractor has "substantially
deviated from an approved affirmative action program." 601 F.2d at 947.
149. 601 F.2d at 948, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2(b) (1976) and ASPR § 12-801(1).
150. 601 F.2d at 948.
151. Id. (Executive Order No. 11,246, § 101, protects persons from discrimination on the basis

of race, creed, color, national origin, and sex. Sex was added as a classification in Executive Order
No. 11,375, issued October 13, 1965). See note 4, supra, citing 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1(b) on affected

class relief.
152. 601 F.2d at 948.
153. See 44 Fed. Reg. 77,006 (1979); codified in 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.30 (1981).
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Instructive on a number of different issues are United States v. New
OrleansPublic Service, Inc. (NOPSI)154 and UnitedStates v. Mississippi
Power & Light Co.' 55 In the scheme of this article, however, the most
significant issue is the view of the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit
that under the circumstances of these cases, and recognizing jurisdiction in the district court to grant the government the injunctive relief
requested, these disputes can best be dealt with by requiring the government to institute its own administrative process.
These cases arose in 1974 when the government sued to require
two public utilities to comply with the Executive Order and the Rules
and Regulations. The public utilities contended that they were not
subject to the Executive Order for a variety of reasons. The certral
theory was that there was no consensual basis to their relationship with
the Government since they were required to provide the services by
law. Moreover, they did not have contracts which included the Executive Order and affirmative action requirements. At issue in the cases
also was the effect of the OFCCP rules which incorporated the Executive Order by operation of the Order and the incorporation of the obligations by reference. (The more comprehensive opinion is in the New
Orleans Public Service case).
The district court issued far-ranging findings and conclusions
before granting the government's request for relief. The court found
that: (1) the Executive Order 11,246 has the force and effect of law;
(2) Executive Order 11,246 requires that specific Executive Order language be placed in each nonexempt government contract; (3) the Executive Order authorizes the Secretary of Labor to adopt the rules and
regulations he deems necessary to effectuate the purposes of the order;
(4) the regulations require that Executive Order language be included
in each nonexempt government contract whether or not such language
is physically incorporated in the contract or agreed upon by the parties;
(5) contractors subject to the Executive Order are also subject to all the
rules and regulations issued thereunder that are not in conflict with it;
(6) the rules and regulations in question are not in conflict with the
order; (7) NOPSI is a nonexempt government contractor; and
(8) NOPSI has violated the Executive Order and the rules and
regulations.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, one judge dissenting on a
154. 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), modfied, 436 U.S. 942 (1978).
155. 553 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1977), modified, 436 U.S. 942 (1978).
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narrow issue.1 56 The Executive Order program is reviewed in the majority opinion and various authorities for its validity discussed and endorsed. Old and new arguments attacking the program are dismissed.
Thus, this case contributes greatly to the bonafides of the Executive
Order program and adds impetus to an increasing judicial acceptance
of the Executive Order and its administrative structure.
While agreeing that the district court had both jurisdiction and
power to direct compliance by injunction, the court of appeals concluded that the program would best be served by the government
resorting to its own administrative procedures. 57 In effect, the government is being required to exhaust the administrative process. This exercise of equitable discretion by the Fifth Circuit rests in part on the
fact that the company's recalcitrance in both NOPSI and Mississippi
Power & Light was due in part to a dispute over coverage. The court
alluded to its expectation of good faith compliance with the administrative process on the part of the companies as a basis for its decision to
remand the matter to that process.1 58
Both of these cases went to the Supreme Court. One issue involved was whether unlimited access to the company's premises, as
well as to its books and records, was in violation of the fifth amendment of the Constitution. After the Supreme Court decided Marshallv.
Barlows, Inc. ,159 an occupational health and safety case in which it
concluded that warrantless searches violated the fifth amendment,
NOPSI and MississppiPower & Light were vacated and remanded for
reconsideration in the light of Barlows. 160 The court of appeals vacated
and remanded the cases to the district courts.' 6' The district courts reaffirmed the earlier decisions and concluded that Barlows did not
render invalid Executive Order 11,246, as amended, or the rules and
62
regulations issued thereunder.
If these cases, as well as Uniroyal discussed earlier, are widely followed in the future, and in my opinion they will be, the attention of the
parties who are interested in the administration of the Executive Order
156. 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), maodo1ed, 436 U.S. 942 (1978).
157. Id. at 472.
158. Id. at 475.
159. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
160. 436 U.S. 942 (1978).
161. 577 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1978).
162. 480 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. La. 1979)- 21 Fair Empl. Practices Cases 445 (D.C. La. 1979), 25
Fair Empl. Practices Cases 250 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981). See also U.S. v.
Mississippi Power & Light, 20 Fair Empl. Practices Cases 47 (S.D. Miss. 1979) to the same effect,
25 Fair Empl. Practices Cases 250 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981). See also
National Bank of Commerce of San Antonio v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1980).
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program will be further focused on the administrative process, with judicial review once agency action is final and ripe. If successful,
OFCCP decisions may replace court cases as the primary source to
which lawyers resort when considering action under the Executive
Order.
We now have rather strong endorsements of the exhaustion requirement from the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia, the
Fifth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, the Third Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit,' 63 which is definitely a significant amount of authority. Additionally, it seems that the present Supreme Court is concerned with
efficiency in the administration of justice. The federal judicial system
has been so overloaded that additional federal judgeships were recently
created. For these reasons, it is highly likely that the requirement of
exhaustion of the administrative process would meet with great favor in
the Supreme Court, unless the Executive Order itself were disfavored.
In United States v. Duquesne Light Company,' 64 a district court refused to dismiss the government's complaint which sought an award of
back pay from the company for persons discriminated against in employment on the basis of race and sex. It ruled that there was statutory
and constitutional authority for the executive to seek restitution from
government contractors allegedly guilty of employment discrimination.' 65 Additionally, the court concluded that the rules and regulations and the Executive Order allowed the government to enforce its
provisions through an action directly in the federal court for back
pay.' 66 The court also suggested that there was no necessity for the
government to pursue the administrative process before it could resort
to the courts under the rules and the Order.
Timken Company v. Vaughn' 67 is a case which illustrates how enforcement of the Executive Order through the administrative process
ought to work once it has reached full maturity. The administrative
163. In the District of Columbia, Hadnott v. Laird, 463 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Uniroyal v.
Marshall, 482 F. Supp. 364 (D.D.C. 1979); in the Third Circuit, Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric,
329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1963); in the Fifth Circuit, United States v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,
553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 553 F.2d 480 (5th
Cir. 1977); in the Ninth Circuit, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319
(9th Cir. 1979); and in the Tenth Circuit, St. Regis Paper Co. v. Marshall, 591 F.2d 612 (10th Cir.
1979). See also, Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Marshall, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 558 (N.D.
Ill. 1979); Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co. v. Dunlop, I I Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 117 (S.D. N.Y.
1975).
164. 423 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
165. Id. at 509.
166. ld. See also United States v. Lee way Motor Freight, Inc., 20 Fair Empl. Practices Cases
1345 (10th Cir. 1979) regarding the backpay issue under Executive Order No. 11,246.
167. 413 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
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regularity in Timken is attributable, at least in part, to the sophistication of counsel. In this case, which arose in 1973 before the consolidation of enforcement in the Department of Labor, Timken initiated an
action in the federal district court to review the final decision and order
of the Supply Agency of the Department of Defense (hereinafter DSA)
debarring Timken from eligibility for contracts with the United States
or contractors doing business with the United States. The company
sought a declaratory judgement and injunctive relief pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act.
The background of the case reveals that the DSA did a compliance
review of Timken's Bucyrus facility and a review of the company's affirmative action plan for that plant in September of 1973. The agency
found the proposed affirmative action plan unacceptable, although virtually the identical plan had been accepted the previous year. The specific issue involved a controversy over the appropriate labor market (a
16 mile area around the plant as contrasted with a 25 mile area). The
affirmative action goals and timetable in the rejected plan were based
upon the minority population and availability in the work force in the
16 mile radius. If the area were that within the approximately 25 mile
radius from the plant, as the government contended, it would have included the city of Mansfield, Ohio, which had a substantial minority
population. Thus, the goals and timetables would have been higher.
Timken's limitation of its labor market area resulted in an affirmative
action plan allegedly in violation of Executive Order 11,246. On December 27, 1973, DSA issued a show cause letter to Timken, which is
the preliminary step leading to a complaint. The parties were not able
to resolve the problem in negotiation and on June 10, 1974, the government agency issued a notice of proposed cancellation, termination or
debarment. On June 28, 1974, Timken responded by denying the violation, asserting several affirmative defenses and requesting a hearing.
On September 12, 1974, counsel for both parties then appeared before
an administrative law judge for a pre-hearing conference in which procedure and timetables for the prosecution of the matter were generally
established. With the issues framed by the "complaint" and the "answer," the matter was heard on November 25 and 26, 1974, with stipulations, testimony of witnesses, introduction of exhibits, crossexamination, arguments, briefs and so forth. The administrative law
judge found that Timken applied a 16 mile radius without regard to
race, but that the radius used as a hiring restriction was arbitrary and
that the affirmative action plan should have been based upon the 25
mile radius which included the city of Mansfield. The administrative
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law judge held that the lesser area was inherently discriminatory and in
violation of the Executive Order. 168
The administrative law judge's proposed findings and conclusions
were adopted by the appropriate executive in the Department of Defense and approved by the Director of the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance as required by the then existing regulations. Timken then
petitioned the district court for judicial review.
The company contended before the district court that the decision
and order were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not
supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that the decision and order were unquestionably a final decision subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act. 169 It held that the
standard of review in these cases as set forth in Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act and as stated by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Voope 170 is as follows: "In all cases
agency action must be set aside if the action was arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, or if
the action failed to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements."' 7' The court went on to declare that in addition to requiring agency action to pass muster under the aforementioned standard,
"the fact of a complete administrative record also requires application
of the substantial evidence standard." 172 It found that substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that the 25 mile radius was the
proper labor market area. 173 It reversed and vacated the decision and
order debarring Timken and entered judgment for the company. The
government did not appeal the case.
On the purely technical issue of what is a proper labor market area
surrounding a given facility, this case may or may not have been correctly decided. But as an exercise in judicial review of an administrative action, the judge's decision was soundly based and theprocess and
the principles ofjudicial review 174 which he followed are those which
168. Id. at 1188.
169. 413 F. Supp. at 1188-89. The court cited Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co. v. Dunlop, 10
EPD
10,252 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Schaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
170. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
171. 413 F. Supp. at 1189, citing 401 U.S. at 413, 414.
172. 413 F. Supp. at 1189. The court referred to Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973), as authority for requiring substantial evidence on the record as a whole as the standard of review.
173. 413 F. Supp. at 1192.
174. That is, the judge reviewed and gave deference to the administrative law judge's decision,
applied the "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion" standard and the "substantial evidence" rule, and knew where the burden of proof lay.
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should be encouraged and widely adopted. Unfortunately, the case has
not received the notoriety for administrative practice purposes which it
deserves. It is mostly known as a defeat of an affirmative action enforcement attempt. Hopefully in the near term it will receive more attention, and a following as more Executive Order cases are subject to
judicial review.
Lawyers for both sides in this case had substantial experience,
both with the writing and rewriting of the rules and regulations, and in
the administrative enforcement process as advocates for the government. They not only understood the process, but also accepted it and
had confidence in its efficacy. I do not think it is wishful thinking to
project that given a comparable degree of acceptability and increased
experience and competence on the part of the emerging Executive Order practicing bar, the orderliness of the administrative process as illustrated by the Timken case would be the norm. Moreover, if the
maturation process continues, even Timken should be the exception. If
the NLRB's experience can be generalized, the overwhelming majority
of the cases should never go past the administrative law judge stage.
The only unqualified 175 success by representatives of the affected
classes in obtaining judicial review and a victory on the merits came in
Legal Aid Society v. Brennan.176 It provided a dimension previously
missing from opinions considered in this paper. The decision is only
part of the original case, the balance of which was pending in the court
below. t77 It is unacceptable as a matter of program administration that
five years after the district court decision we have only a partial resolution of the matter on appeal, a matter which under a mature system
should have been resolved within the administrative process. The government has yet to come to terms with the rights of protected individuals to seek assistance of the courts, particularly when the government
fails to act, or, as in this case, acts improperly.
One aspect of the case is supportive of my contention that there is
175. Legal Aid Society v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974) was the decision below.
In Lewis v. Western Airlines, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Cal. 1974), plaintiffs won a qualified
victory at least in resisting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The victory is
qualified in that the court noted that to maintain the causes of action against the contractor the
plaintiffs would have to show, as they had pleaded, that they had exhausted administrative remedies which were reasonably available. The case was a suit against several employees of the federal
government and Western Airlines regarding non-compliance with the Executive Order and may
not add anything beyond a procedural device to keep a defendant contractor in a case where the
main object is a suit against the government for mandamus.
176. 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub. nonm Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v.
Legal Aid Society, 100 S. Ct. 3010 (1980).
177. 608 F.2d at 1327.
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a creeping acceptance of the administrative process as the appropriate
forum for resolution of issues arising under the Executive Order program. Both the appellants (contractors) whose affirmative action plans
78
form the basis of the district court's order, and the federal appellee,
invoke, among other things, the exhaustion of remedies doctrine as a
basis for reversing the court below. Interestingly, the appellants asserted that appeal of an affirmative action plan is not subject to judicial
review, at least not at the behest of the representatives of the affected
79
classes. 1
In Legal Aid Society, 80 several Black residents of Alameda
County, California, and the Legal Aid Society which represented them
brought an action against federal officials responsible for enforcing the
Executive Order, alleging that they had failed to carry out their duty to
insure that food processing contractors were maintaining adequate affirmative action programs. The district court granted partial summary
judgment and injunctive relief.18 1 The plaintiffs had two claims in their
main case. First, they charged that the officials of the United States
Department of Agriculture, which under the then existing rule was the
compliance agency for the companies, failed to review affirmative action program of the majority of federal contractors within their compliance jurisdiction. 182 Second, the plaintiffs alleged that where
compliance reviews were undertaken, the Department of Agriculture
regularly approved programs that did not comply with Revised Order
Number 4.183 In discovery proceedings relating to the second claim,
the plaintiffs had obtained affirmative action programs of twenty-nine
contractors in the Alameda County area that had been reviewed and
approved by the Department of Agriculture between 1972 and 1973.
Plaintiffs analyzed them, documented their deficiencies, and requested
the court to restrain the officials from approving non-complying programs and to require them to rescind approval of deficient plans and
178. Federal officials filed and then withdrew a notice of appeal and appeared in the court of
appeals in support of the judgment below. See 608 F.2d at 1327.
179. No doubt they would contest the proposition of unreviewability if they were the ones
seeking review of the affirmative action plan such as was the case in Timken v. Vaughan, 413 F.
Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ohio 1976). See 608 F.2d at 1332 nn. 22-23 discussing and distinguishing Farkas, Farmer, Gnotta v. U.S., 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), and at 1337 n. 33 discussing and
distinguishing Hadnott v. Laird, and Freeman v. Shultz.
180. Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
181. Id. at 140.
182. The main defendants were the Secretary of Labor, the Director of OFCC, the Secretary
of United States Department of Agriculture (U.S.D.A.), and the Chief of the Contract Compliance Division of the Department of U.S.D.A.'s Office of Equal Opportunity. That portion of the
case was still pending below in 1979 when the court of appeals decided the instant action.
183. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.40, 60-2.10 through 60-2.13 (1980).
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initiate enforcement proceedings against the companies submitting
those plans. The district court granted the plaintiffs' motions, concluding that the affirmative action requirements mandated by the rules and
regulations were absent from the plans approved by the officials. It
declared ten specific programs to be in violation of the regulations and
therefore illegally approved. The court ordered the officials to cease
approving programs that did not comply, to rescind approval of the ten
non-complying programs, to issue show cause notices to those contractors submitting them, and to seek sanctions against any contractor that
1 84
did not develop and implement a complying program.
The appellants in the case at the court of appeals level, who included four of the ten contractors whose plans were specifically declared unacceptable as well as the Chamber of Commerce, were not
parties to the proceedings below. After partial summary judgment was
granted, they sought to intervene for the purpose of reopening the proceedings. The district court denied their motion but permitted intervention for purposes of appeal.
On appeal they presented five issues:
1. They contended that approval of the affirmative action plans
by a compliance agency is not subject to judicial review or remedies, at
least not at the behest of these appellees.
2. They contended that judicial review, if available, was premature because appellees had not exhausted administrative remedies.
3. They argued that they were entitled to participate in the proceedings below, and that entry of summary judgement without their
presence deprived them of due process.
4. They contended that in finding the affirmative action programs inadequate and in formulating the decree, the district court relied upon standards that were erroneous in substance and not lawfully
promulgated.
5. Finally, they argued that the decree imposing hiring and promotion quotas was in violation of the Constitution and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.185
The federal appellees argued that the appellants lacked the requisite interest to maintain the appeal. 186 The court gave short shrift to the
government's argument that the appellants were not properly before
184. 381 F. Supp. at 140.
185. 608 F.2d at 1327.
186. The Labor Department appears here in support of the judgment. The Legal Aid Society
was its antagonist in the action below. Both joined in the court of appeals action against the
appellants who were not involved in the action below.
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the court on appeal. It also rejected appellants' argument that they
were denied due process by not being able to force the matter to a
rehearing, concluding that their participation on appeal rendered
87
harmless any defect in the prior proceeding.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit thus added its weight
to that of other jurisdictions regarding the validity of the Executive Order. It notes that while disclosure of information regulations may not
be sufficiently rooted in authority from Congress to have the force and
effect of law, there can be no doubt that the essential features of the
affirmative action program reflected in Revised Order Number 4 issued
under the Executive Order' 8 8 were effectively ratified by Congress in
adopting the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.189
The court also asserted that administrative action is subject to judicial review unless it is clear that such review is not available. Noting
that nothing in the order precluded judicial review, and indeed the order appeared to anticipate such review by preserving remedies otherwise provided by law, the court expressed doubt that an Executive
Order could of its own force preclude such review. 190 The court concluded that although the Executive Order and the implementing regulations placed heavy reliance upon administrative expertise and
discretion, not all compliance review action was committed to the discretion of the agency. 19 It discussed the regulations with regard to
affirmative action and isolated those matters which by the language of
the order were mandatory. It then concluded that judicial review was
available to insure that compliance officials perform their nondiscretionary duty to refrain from approving plans that do not contain elements mandated by the regulations. 92 It asserted that the remedies
available under the APA may be invoked against officials who violate
93
this duty. Moreover, mandamus was also appropriate.
Legal Aid Society v. Brennan did not take a contrary view to that
taken by cases already discussed regarding the necessity of exhaustion
of the administrative process. Rather, this court harmonized its approach with the earlier decisions. It noted that appellees sought neither
recognition of a supplemental private enforcement mechanism nor
187.
188.
189.
F.2d at
190.
191.
192.
193.

608 F.2d at 1329.
Revised Order 4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1971).
5 U.S.C. §§ 5108 et seq. (1976), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I through 2000e-17 (1976). See 608
1329-30, particularly n. 14.
See 608 F.2d at 1330, n. 15.
608 F.2d at 1330.
Id. at 1331.
Id.
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damages for specific acts of discrimination against them. Rather, they
were asking the court to review the government's own enforcement effort against standards established by the Executive Order and the regulations. 94 It noted that the reluctance of courts to imply separate
private enforcement rights from statutory regulations which provided
explicitly only for government enforcement procedures and penalties
was not applicable to actions such as the one before it. 195 It then stated:

If the cases on which appellants rely correctly deny the right to initiate a private suit against a discriminating employer under Executive
Order 11,246, judicial oversight of enforcement efforts of government
officials through such a suit as this becomes doubly important; without it, no remedy would be available against compliance agencies
specific requirements of the Executive Order and
that ignore the
96
regulations. 1
With regard to the exhaustion of administrative remedy claim, the
court declared that there was no administrative remedy to be exhausted.197 It observed that the complaint was directed against the ultimate cause of appellees' injury, i.e., the systematic approval by
government officials of affirmative action programs that did not contain
the provisions required by the rules.198 The appellees sought a declaration of standards by which the adequacy of affirmative action plans
must be judged and of duties of compliance officials in implementing
those standards. The administrative procedures to which appellants
pointed were not designed for processing cases of this sort nor for providing relief of this scope. Consequently, there was no administrative
remedy to exhaust. 199
Moreover, even if the complaint procedure were applicable to appellees' private claims, the court would not reverse for failure to exhaust in this case. The court noted that as applied here the requirement
that administrative remedies be exhausted was a judicially created doctrine to be employed in the manner that best serves the competing interest of the court, the agency and the aggrieved individuals in the
circumstances of a particular case. It was not legislatively mandated as
a prerequisite for judicial intervention. The private appellees did not
deliberately flout the administrative process, such as could be claimed
in Freeman v. Shultz and Hadnott v. Laird, but rather they submitted
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id. at 1332.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1336.
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their grievances to the agency by informal means before filing suit.
The agency ruled against them on the merits, and after litigation was
commenced, the lower court required the private appellees to present
their claims to compliance officials for a second time. This was to no
avail. The agency officials were afforded an opportunity to correct
their errors, to make their expertise available, and to develop an administrative record for review. They declined to do so.2°°
The fascinating aspect of the case is that the order of the court
below directing the agency to institute proceedings to deny contracts to
the non-complying contractors seems undisturbed by the Court of Appeals. One wonders if this will form a basis for assertions that representatives of the affected class may sue the Department of Labor to
require it to initiate debarment proceedings rather than to refer their
complaints to EEOC pursuant to the Memorandum of
20 1
Understanding.
In Reynolds Metals Company v. Rumsfeld,20 2 plaintiffs challenged,
among other things, the Memorandum of Understanding between
OFCC and EEOC regarding the referral by OFCC of individual complaints to the EEOC for processing. It was argued that the memorandum improperly delegated the responsibility for processing OFCC
complaints to the EEOC. The plaintiff asserted that the regulations
implementing the Executive Order directed the Compliance Office and
compliance agencies to promptly investigate and resolve all complaints
about discrimination filed with them against a government
203
contractor.
The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, distinguishing the
functions by noting that the Compliance Office under the Executive
Order monitors government contractors to determine whether they are
meeting their commitments as equal opportunity employers. 2°4 A priority was given to the eradication of systemic discrimination rather
200. See 608 F.2d at 1337-38, and text accompanying notes 33, 34, and 35. Throughout this
opinion, acceptance of the administrative process under the Executive Order was manifested by
this court. The additional contribution it made was to delineate a type of case where exhaustion
will not be required while elucidating and affirming the situation under the Executive Order
where prior resort to the administrative process was proper. The opinion is a powerful affirmation
of the validity of the order and the rules and regulations and a particularly lucid discussion of the
affirmative action requirement in the face of a "reverse discrimination" claim. 608 F.2d at 134244. This decision came after Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), and United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), were decided by the
Supreme Court.
201. 46 Fed. Reg. 7435 (1981).
202. 564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978).
203. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.21, 60-1.24, 60-1.26 (1980).
204. 564 F.2d at 668.
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than to the investigation and resolution of complaints about isolated
instances of discrimination. The duty of the Compliance Office and
compliance agencies to receive and promptly process complaints had to
be considered in that context. The complaints which OFCC processes
are those dealing with systemic violations of the company's contractual
obligations to comply with the Executive Order rather than those dealing with the violations of rights afforded individual employees under
Title VII. The court described the Executive Order sanctions and asserted that they are regarded by the Compliance Office as inappropriate remedies for cases of isolated discrimination against a single
employee. The court found the allocation of functions between OFCC
and EEOC to be consistent with the Executive Order and the pertinent
regulations. 20 5 Consequently, transmission of the individual complaints to the Commission was not an unlawful delegation of authority.
The plaintiffs also challenged the memorandum as not being issued in
accordance with the rulemaking procedure of the APA. 20 6 This was
rejected.
More significant for the question of access to judicial review may
be the issue of the consistency of deferral of individual complaints.
This question points to a potential conflict with the Ninth Circuit's
willingness to mandate initiation of the administrative process to impose sanctions in Legal Aid Society v. Brennan.2° 7 It should be noted
that affirmative action plan defects are clearly systemic defects, and the
Reynolds situation would not necessarily yield the same results if Brennan were applied, even in the Ninth Circuit. It is possible under Brennan to permit a right of action against deferral of systemic complaints
to EEOC as a violation of the Memorandum and deny one against
deferral of individual complaints. The current rule of the Department
of Labor evidences no general intent to defer the systemic complaints 20 8 but seems to permit it.
As a practical matter, what may be more significant regarding the
likelihood of future challenges to the deferral of cases by OFCCP to
EEOC for processing may be the relevance of 42 U.S.C. § 1988209 to
205. Id. at 669. Accord Emerson Electric Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1979), and
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Marshall, 465 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
206. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1) and 553 (1970).
207. See Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal.
1974).
208. For the memorandum of understanding at issue in Reynolds, see 39 Fed. Reg. 35,855
(1975). An earlier version was in 35 Fed. Reg. 18,461 (1970). The current memorandum is in 46
Fed. Reg. 7435 (1981).
209. Civil Rights Attorney's Awards Fees Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
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such actions. Congress amended Section 1988 to provide for jurisdiction in the federal courts to allow the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees as part of the cost of suing. Just recently, the United States
Supreme Court, in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey,210 confirmed
the view that Section 706(f) and Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil
Right Act of 1964, as amended, authorized federal courts to allow attorney's fees for work done in state administrative and judicial proceedings to which the complaint was referred pursuant to the
provisions of Title VII. The Court noted with favor cases involving
federal employees in which fee awards have been upheld for work in
federal administrative proceedings that must be exhausted as a condition to filing an action in the federal court. 2 11 It also approved awards
2 12
of fees to public interest group lawyers.
However, the laws which will support attorney's fees are listed in
42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the Executive Order is not included. 21 3 In order
to obtain attorney's fees for suing the government in cases such as Legal
Aid Society, affected class advocates will have to be rather ingenious.
On the face of the aforementioned statute, it does not seem that a cause
of action under the Executive Order would support attorney's fees as
part of costs. Lawyers in general practice, as distinguished from public
interest lawyers, are likely to take the more practical route of pursuing
OFCCP deferral of individual complaints or of complaints involving
more than one individual to EEOC. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. directs the financial traffic toward Title VII administrative hearings and
court actions, not toward Executive Order 11,246. Moreover, cases
which involve large numbers of individual employees which can be
converted into class actions under Title VII have even more lucrative
possibilities for the private lawyer. This would be frustrated if OFCCP
preempted the action.
Even winning a right of action by implication under the Executive
Order would not, without more, seem to qualify under the language of
210. New York Gas Light Club, Inc. v. Carey, 100 S. Ct. 2024 (1980).
211. Id. at 2030, n. 2, citing Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1978); Fischer v.
Adams, 572 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1978); Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Foster v.
Boorstin, 561 F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Johnson v. United States, 554 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1977).
212. 100 S. Ct. at 2034, n.9, citing Reynolds v. Coomey, 567 F.2d 1166 (1st Cir. 1978); Torres
v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976). The plaintiff in Carey was represented by counsel employed
by the NAACP Special Contribution Fund, See 100 S.Ct. at 2027, n. 1.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as amended Pub. L. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976), provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and
1986, of this title, Title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding by
or on behalf of the United States to enforce. . . . the Internal Revenue Code, or Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
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the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Act. It would be necessary to persuade
the court that enforcement actions under the Executive Order program
were also intended to be compensated, if not under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
then under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that such
results were within the spirit if not the letter of New York Gaslight Club,
Inc. Actions involving the enforcement of affirmative action plans
might have a stronger chance since they are specifically referred to in

Section 718 of Title VII. 2 14 Such an interpretation would require the
court to make a generous stretch of the law, and it is doubtful that this
21 5
Supreme Court would be willing to do so.
An Implied Right of Action Under Executive Order 11,246
There is a chance that if Farmerv. PhiladelphiaElectric and Farkas
v. Texas Instruments were litigated in 1980, they would permit affected
class plaintiffs to sue contractors directly. Further, it seems possible
that those cases could come out the other way and Hadnott v. Laird and
Freeman v. Shultz remain unchanged. My theory regarding Farkas
and Farmer is not to suggest that the third party beneficiary theories
rejected there would be approved under the current view of the law,
but rather that there is a chance that if those cases came along now, the
court would imply a right of action and permit the lawsuits to go forward under the Executive Order against the contractor to enforce the
obligation.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-17 (1981).
215. An argument can be made that Executive Order 11,246, as amended, is now an integral
part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and as such should not be considered merely an act of the President. If successful, Title VII attorneys' fees provisions would be
applicable. The Seventh Circuit recently reversed a district court's ruling that fees for time spent
seeking debarment under the Executive Order were not compensable despite the employer's admission that it would not have settled the Title VII case had it not been debarred. Chrapliwy v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Practices Cases 19 (7th Cir. 1982).
In 46 Fed. Reg. 50,376, the Department of Labor reissued and made effective December 29,
1981, its regulation implementing the Equal Access to Justice Act (P.L. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2327, 5
U.S.C. 504). The rules had previously been issued on October 9, 1981 and revoked October 13,
1981. These rules provide for attorneys' fees when an eligible party prevails over an agency in an
adversarial adjudication. Adversarial adjudications include proceedings of the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs, Employment Standards Administration, hearings prior to the denial, withholding, termination or suspension of a government contract or any portion of a contract
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended and 41 C.F.R. Part 60-30.
To be eligible for an award of attorneys' fees and other expenses under the Act, the applicant
must be a "party" as that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. 551(3), to an adversary adjudication for
which it seeks an award; the applicant must prevail; and must meet all the conditions of eligibility
set out in the Department's rules.
While it is possible under these rules for a representative of the affected class in an OFCC
proceeding to be included, it is far from clear at this point that they are covered. Even more
uncertain, if covered, is when they would be considered to have "prevailed over an agency."
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In Cannon v. The University of Chicago,2 16 the Supreme Court
made it clear that Title IX 2 17 provided a private right of action for the
affected classes and permitted the plaintiff to sue the University of Chicago for an alleged violation of the ban against sex discrimination contained in Title IX. In the process, the Court also indicated that there is
a private right of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Why is there then no implied right of action under Executive Order 11,246 in light of this recent upsurge in the number of cases finding
a cause of action by implication? 21 8 I suggest a practical answer-it is
no longer needed. The principles of Cort v. Ash, 2 19 however, could fit
the Executive Order program. The Supreme Court set forth its test in
Cori v. Ash for determining whether there should be a right of action
by implication. The four factors considered are as follows: 1) whether
the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was
enacted; 2) whether there is any indication of legislative (executive) intent either to create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff or to deny
one; 3) whether implication of such a right is consistent with the legislative (in this case executive) scheme; and 4) whether the cause of action
2 20
is one traditionally relegated to state law.
In Cannon, the Supreme Court applied the Cort v. Ash standards
and concluded that there was an implied right of action. Thus, the
individual could sue the University of Chicago (the recipient of the
federal assistance) directly. An argument can be made that if the Executive Order is treated as a law and the principles which emerge from
Cannon are applied, consistency would dictate that a private right of
action be found under the Executive Order.
One barrier to such a conclusion would be the Court's reading in
Cannon of the "legislative history," or in this case the "Executive Order
history." There is evidence that consideration was given to explicitly
permitting a private right of action under the Executive Order in 1953
in a report to the Eisenhower administration. 22 1 The report recommended against amending the Executive Order to provide a private
right of action. Nothing was ever done to change what was then the
216. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
217. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000h-1 through 2000h-6 (1976).
218. See Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights. The Casefor a Sympathetic
View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378 (1978), and Note, Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes-The
Emergence ofa Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429 (1976).
219. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
220. Id. at 78.
221. See Pasley, The Non-Discrimination Clause and Government Contracts, note 33, supra.
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practice and it is conceivable that the Supreme Court might give weight
to this as "legislative history."
Any other convincing rationale to exclude the Executive Order
from the principles of Cannon comes hard. The 1953 considerations
seem a bit thin as evidence of executive intent although this could be
buttressed by the fact that courts have clearly articulated since 1967
that no private right of action was intended under the President's Executive Orders. All Presidents and the Congress have had clear notice of
the courts' interpretations. Presidents have changed the Executive Order a number of times, and the Congress has by its actions ratified the
Presidents' changes. The Supreme Court could conclude that this is
sufficient to deny an implied right of action. Additionally, Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Cannon has warned us that in the
future the Supreme Court is going to be extremely reluctant to imply a
cause of action absent specific legislative intent. 222 A further distinction between Cannon and the Executive Order is that in Cannon the
Court found support for a private right of action in the inclusion of
Titles IX and VI in the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Act of 1976. No
Executive Orders are specified in that Act.
On the other hand, Title VI and Title IX cover grants; Executive
Order 11,246 covers contracts, which are often grants in contract form.
Title VI excludes employment (see Section 604) unless the purpose of
the grant relates to employment. Many entities such as universities are
covered by Title VI, Title IX and Executive Order 11,246. The private
attorney general concept 22 3 is an integral part of civil rights law. Title
VII itself is heavily dependent upon the actions of a private counsel for
the affected classes. The case law for denying the private right of action against a contractor under Executive Order 11,246 is not so strong
where individual rights are concerned. As our analysis has made clear
so far, the administrative process is cumbersome at best for the vindication of private rights. However, under the practice of deferring individual complaints to EEOC, permitting individuals to sue contractors
222. See concurring opinion of Rehnquist and Stewart in Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441
U.S. at 717. Since Executive Order 11,246 pre-dates Cannon it should be governed by the preCannon principles of Cort v. Ash. The modern law of implied rights of action began in 1964 with
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 416 (1964). This was contemporaneous with the beginning of
enforcement efforts under the executive order but the early cases did not seek to use the implied
right of action theory. The Court now seems to be hostile to further extensions, unless Congress or
the executive clearly indicates positive intent. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94
HARv. L. REV. 77, 279-288 (1980).
223. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
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directly under the Executive Order would not be at odds with the Executive Order administrative scheme nor would it affect its efficiency.
I do not suggest that because these principles could be fitted to the
Executive Order that they should be. In fact, I might urge the contrary.
I do not believe that further proliferation of equal employment laws is
in the best interest of the affected classes. There is marginal utility at
best in permitting private suits against contractors that cannot be
achieved now under Title VII or other laws. The exception may be
suits for seniority relief not available under Title VII's qualified immunity. 224 If it is finally determined that the Executive Order will not
support seniority relief in excess of that available under Title VII, then
little is lost if no private right of action under the Executive Order exists.225 I think it totally unrealistic to expect the courts to impose debarment or other systemic sanctions in private suits where there is no
resort to the administrative process, and the trend is clearly toward judicial review of that process. What then is missing? What is still missing is the confidence in the affected class communities that the
government will enforce the Executive Order. That lack of confidence
has always been the problem, but I fear it cannot be resolved by arcane
legal theories. It can only be assured by political power.
Perhaps further consolidation of the equal employment functions
at the federal level would contribute to a solution. An agency whose
sole function is equal employment and whose major constituency is the
affected classes would be more prone to enforce vigorously EEO obligations than would a multiplicity of agencies with a multiplicity of missions and constituencies.
Minorities are certainly entitled to be suspicious of the reliability
of the executive branch of the federal government in respect to this
program. Although presidents since Roosevelt have had a mechanism
of some sort in place to deal with discrimination, few if any have enforced them with vigor. The Carter administration instituted the most
actions for sanctions against contractors for employment discrimination but that fact may be due as much to the culmination of the maturity of the administration process as to the will to enforce. The Reagan
administration has been marked by great uncertainty with threats of
retreats coming from an assortment of voices within the administration,
and certain significant retreats in the proposed rules of the Office of
224. See National Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
225. See U.S. v. Trucking Management, 662 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. East
Texas Motor Freight System, Inc., 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).
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Federal Contract Compliance Programs. 226 If the continued existence
of the President's program is at risk, why should one suggest resort to
the administrative process as the more desirable course for affected
classes?
First, because of the prediction of increased reluctance on the part
of the courts to take matters on pre-enforcement judicial review, despite the suggestion in LegalAid Society v. Brennan,227 and because, in
my opinion, Brennan is limited authority for pre-enforcement judicial
review.
Second, a liberal reading of Hadnott v. Laird,228 and cases following its reasoning, that plaintiffs' resort to OFCCP can result in judicial
oversight of agency's action at any point at which any such action is
final and therefore ripe for review. It is my opinion that the administrative process has started to come of age and that the other cases discussed in this paper which emphasize administrative procedure
represent the most authoritative sentiment in the courts although the
Supreme Court's contribution has been largely negative in denials of
review.
Third, affected class representatives should not forget the lessons
of their own past with regard to the viability of the administrative
route. In NationalAssociationfor the Advancement of ColoredPeople v.
FederalPower Commission,229 the NAACP, and several other organizations representing Blacks, Spanish-speaking Americans and females,
petitioned the Federal Power Commission for the issuance of a rule
requiring equal employment opportunity and nondiscrimination in the
employment practices of companies which the Federal Power Commission regulates. Upon refusal to initiate the rule-making process by the
Commission, the plaintiffs sought judicial review and took the matter
to the Supreme Court. While they were defeated on the substantive
issue, the procedural victory is potentially more important in the long
run. The case clearly stands for the proposition that civil rights advocates should be able to challenge agency rule-making within the confines of judicial review of administrative process. Clearly, public
interest law firms can have greater impact in monitoring agency rules
than in attempting to push individual complaint cases, either through
the administrative process or through pre-enforcement judicial review.
226. 47 Fed. Reg. 17,770 (1982); see particularly proposal to restrict or eliminate back pay for
affirmative action cases, reduction in coverage, etc.
227. Supra, n. 173.
228. 463 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
229. 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
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Finally, I opt for primary resort to the administrative process for
vindication of individual rights because I expect the executive order
program to remain in effect. The proposition that the President with a
"stroke of the executive pen" can eliminate the Executive Order program prohibiting employment discrimination is politically impracticable and legally suspect.
Nullhfcation of Affirmative Action With the Stroke
of the Executive Pen?
Professor James S. Blumstein of the Vanderbilt University School
of Law, in discussing the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company's challenge to the validity of the Affirmative Action Program under Executive Order 11,246, asserted that "Each President has the Constitutional
duty to determine the proper balance of power between the legislative
and Executive Branches. Since the Affirmative Action Program is completely a product of executive action, the new administration is in a
position to annul the program with a stroke of the executive pen. Then
it would be up to Congress to take the initiative, if it chose, to establish
'230
such Affirmative Action policies.
The aforementioned statement suffers from a multiplicity of shortcomings. With regard to the balance between the legislative and executive branch it is the Court which draws the lines. While the Affirmative
Action Program originally involved the act of the President alone,2 3'
subsequent to the Kennedy order, beginning with Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Affirmative Action Program became a product
of executive and legislative action. In subsequent Congressional ratifications of the budgets of the Department of Labor, after extensive debates over the Affirmative Action Program, it is clear that Congress,
with specific knowledge, has continued those activities until the present
day. Moreover, when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was revised in
1972, whatever imperfections might have infected the original Affirmative Action of the Executive were cured by substantive action of Congress. Not only did Congress reject crippling amendments to the
President's existing program, but Congress also enacted positive law
which gives Affirmative Action obligations statutory status. 232 In pass230. Wall Street Journal,November 28, 1980, at 10, column 4.
231. President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10,925 which first clearly contained the Affirmative Action obligation. Note 2, supra.
232. Section 718 of the Civil Rights Act of Title VII as amended in 1972:
SPECIAL PROVISION WITH RESPECT TO DENIAL,
TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
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ing the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973233 and the Veterans Readjustment Act of 1974234 Congress provided for affirmative action,
albeit limited, for three new classes and affixed their administration to
the existing structures in the Labor Department. This is clear Congressional reliance on the continuation of the program which it had previously approved.
If that were not enough justification, in 1978 President Carter substantially reorganized these civil rights efforts and submitted to Congress, in Reorganization Plan No. 1,235 a total overhaul of the program.
It provided for phased adjustments in the entire civil rights endeavor
and consolidated the affirmative action activity in the Department of
Labor rather than in the contracting agencies which under successive
Executive Orders had primary responsibility for enforcing the contractual obligations since 1961.
We make occasional reference to the truism that Presidential Executive Orders, validly issued, have the force and effect of law, and
remain in place like acts of the Congress until changed by the President. However, no more delicate area of government exists than the
Constitutional limits to the President's power to execute as it may collide with the power of Congress to legislate and determine what there is
for the President to act upon.
Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, 236 noted:
A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty of
really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete
problems of executive power as they actually present themselves. . . . A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly
speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt
quotations from respected sources on each side of any question.
They largely cancel each other. And court decisions are indecisive
Sec. 718. No Government contract, or portion thereof, with any employer, shall be
denied, withheld, terminated, or suspended, by any agency or officer of the United States
under any equal employment opportunity law or order, where such employer has an
affirmative action plan which has previously been accepted by the Government for the
same facility within the past twelve months without first according such employer full
hearing and adjudication under the provisions of Title 5, section 554, and the following
pertinent sections: Provided,That if such employer has deviated substantially from such
previously agreed to affirmative action plan, this section shall not apply: Providedfurther, That for the purposes of this section an affirmative action plan shall be deemed to
have been accepted by the Government at the time the appropriate compliance agency
has accepted such plan unless within forty-five days thereafter the Office of Federal Contract Compliance has disapproved such plan.
233. Pub. L. No. 93-112 §§ 501-04, 87 Stat. 390-94 (1973).
234. 38 U.S.C. 2012 and 2014.212 (1976). 3 C.F.R. 321 (Jan. 1, 1979).
235. 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978).
236. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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because of the judicial practice
of dealing with the largest questions
237
in the most narrow way.
He also noted that Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.238 Jackson postulated three categories of Presidential power. In
dividing, simplistically by his own admission, those powers into three
categories, he noted that when the President acts pursuant to an express
or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum
for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In the second category, Justice Jackson noted that
when the President acts in absence of either Congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, Congressional inertia, indifference or quiesence may sometimes,
at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent Presidential responsibility.
He asserted the President is at his lowest ebb in the third category
when his act is incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress and in that circumstance he can rely only on his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
239
matter.
I suggest that a review of the history of the Presidents' Executive
Orders as they relate to employment discrimination put them in an almost unique category. As Justice Rehnquist, in Dames and Moore v.
Regan ,240 noted:
Although we have in the past and do today find Justice Jackson's classification of executive actions into three general categories
analytically useful, we should be mindful . . . that 'The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black
and white.' . . . and it is doubtless the case that executive action in
any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeon-holes,
but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit 1con24
gressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.
It seems to me a program which has been in existence since 1941,
albeit pursuant to the original initiative of a president, is hardly a candidate for presidential cancellation with a stroke of the pen. The presi237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

343 U.S. at 634, 635.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 635-38.
101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
101 S. Ct. at 2981-82.
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dents and the congresses over four decades have indeed constructed a
three-legged stool which demonstrates the "interdependent nature of
the tripartite structure established by the Constitution." 242 Clearly, it is
within presidential authority to initiate programs which would lead to
elimination of his involvement in private employment discrimination,
243
and Congress may choose to handle the entire problem differently.
However, given the past interdependence and reliance by the Congress
on the continued existence of the executive order initiative, at the very
least, the President would be advised to act with the concurrence of
Congress.
The Executive Reorganization Act 244 would have been the ideal
vehicle for proposed changes in the executive order program on employment discrimination. President Carter used it in 1978. However,
Congress has not revived, as yet, the presidential reorganization authority which expired in 1981.245 Under the circumstances, as a practical, rather than legal or constitutional matter, the President may be
limited to more traditional legislative approaches to changes in this
area of law, or to seeking revitalization of the reorganization authority.
The risks of attempting a "stroke of the pen" approach to employment
discrimination seem to involve potential costs which far outweigh any
246
benefits to the presidency.
The FinalMaturity
The final maturity in administrative enforcement of Executive Order 11,246 would be hastened if the President or the Congress reorganized the Civil Rights functions so that there is an orderly
administration of the equal employment field. The President, in Reorganization Plan Number 1 of 1978, took some steps in the direction
toward consolidation. His message suggested that further consolida242. See Comment, The PhiladelphiaPlan." 4 Study in the Dynamics of Executive Powers, 39
U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 758 (1972).
243. An argument can be made that the Congress can notprohibit the President from acting to
insure that the federal government does not aid and abet private discrimination. The Constitution, in Article II, enjoins the President to take care that the Constitution and laws of the United
States are faithfully executed. Discrimination is prohibited by the thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth,
and fifth amendments to the Constitution. Arguably the President has the independent, constitutional responsibility to insure that the executive branch does not contribute 'to private
discrimination.
244. 5 U.S.C. 901-912 (1966).
245. 5 U.S.C. 905(b), (1980).
246. See Broff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1 (1982)
for an excellent discussion of presidential powers and judicial review, and Symposium on CostBenefit Analysis andAgency Decision Making: An Analysis ofExecutive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIZ.
L. REV. 4 (1981) which discusses a host of relevant issues.
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tion would be instituted if the 1978 efforts demonstrated that this would
be feasible. Of concern earlier was the lack of sufficient administrative
experience and expertise, and to some extent, credibility. The President did, however, give the EEOC what has turned out to be significant
influence, if not power, in giving it the coordinating role for all federal
247
equal employment opportunity efforts.
Two small goals remain: 1) transfer to the EEOC the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance functions which in the 1978 order were
consolidated in the Labor Department; and 2) delegate, or direct the
Justice Department to delegate, to the EEOC the authority under Title
28 of the United States Code 248 to go into court to enforce the contractual obligations under the Executive Order.
Such a consolidation would take care of a number of difficulties.
To the extent that deferral of individual complaints filed under the Executive Order to EEOC for processing under Title VII while retaining
jurisdiction creates an awkwardness, all complaints, individual or systemic, would then go to the same agency. Once the Commission received the complaint it would then decide which avenue to take:
a) pursue the matter as an individual complaint under its pre-enforcement Title VII procedures, or b) pursue it as a systemic or compliance
matter under its new Executive Order processes with the ultimate sanction being debarment, cancellation or termination, or a combination of
both.
If the Justice Department delegated enforcement of the contractual obligations, the General Counsel of the EEOC could litigate specific enforcement and cancellation matters, as well as Title VII matters.
Where individual actions did not warrant the "H bomb" relief of cancellation or debarment, the General Counsel, after a finding of cause
by the Commission, could pursue the matter as a Title VII case which
the General Counsel rather than the complainant would then
litigate.

249

There would be a side benefit to such a move. It would provide all
247. President's Reorganization Plan I of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978).
248. 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1976).
249. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources recently released a report, after
oversite hearings on Executive Order No. 11,246, which calls for a new executive order, or if its
recommendations are not heeded, enactment of a statutorily based federal contract compliance
program. The report concludes there is a need for an executive order program so long as it is not
duplicative of other federal activities or [does not] discourage participation. 110 LAB. REL. REP.
28 (BNA) (1982). The suggestions in this article are not inconsistent with the reported recommendations of that Committee regarding administrative structure, except I suggest absorption of
OFCCP by EEOC.
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five EEOC Commissioners with greater substantive duties to perform.
Under the rules, the OFCCP process requires hearings by Administrative Law Judges and then referral to the Secretary of Labor for his
concurrence or modification as the last step in the process. Consolidation in EEOC could convert the Commission into a bonafide adjudicatory body. In Executive Order cases, it could perform an adjudicatory
function much like that performed by the National Labor Relations
Board under the National Labor Relations Act. It seems to me this
would give added strength to the Executive Order process.
In addition, consolidation, with the exception of leaving the actions against states with the Attorney General, would provide plaintiffs
and respondents alike with "one-stop-shopping." It would facilitate
the development of uniform interpretations of substantive law and permit a more efficient administration of all equal employment opportunity laws which should be used to reinforce each other. The
government would speak virtually with one voice.
On the main theme of this paper, a coordinated and centralized
administrative process would enhance and hasten more rapid progress
toward administrative maturity.

